arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 1707.02418cs.GT
收藏

讨价还价问题的稳定性、公平性和随机游动

Stability, Fairness and Random Walks in the Bargaining Problem

Jakob Kapeller, Stefan Steinerberger

摘要:

我们研究了经典的谈判问题和它的两个典型的解决方案,(纳什和Kalai-Smorodinsky),从一个新的角度来看:我们要求的解决方案的稳定性,如果双方球员都能够扭曲基本的谈判过程中参考第三方(例如法院)。通过探索最简单的情况,即第三方的决策是随机做出的,我们得到了一个稳定的解决方案,其中参与者没有任何激励来参考这样的第三方。虽然纳什和Kalai-Smorodinsky解决方案都不能确保稳定的情况下,参考第三方是可能的,我们发现,Kalai-Smorodinsky解决方案似乎总是占主导地位的稳定分配,构成新的支持,有利于后者。

英文摘要:

We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a third party (e.g. a court). By exploring the simplest case, where decisions of the third party are made randomly we obtain a stable solution, where players do not have any incentive to refer to such a third party. While neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are able to ensure stability in case reference to a third party is possible, we found that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution seems to always dominate the stable allocation which constitutes novel support in favor of the latter.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑