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arXiv 2209.04030cs.CRcs.AI
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揭示联邦学习抵御投毒攻击中隐私与认证鲁棒性之间的联系

Unraveling the Connections between Privacy and Certified Robustness in Federated Learning Against Poisoning Attacks

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-尚佩恩分校);IBM Research(IBM研究院);UC Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);Amazon Web Services(亚马逊云服务);Stanford University(斯坦福大学)

Chulin Xie, Yunhui Long, Pin-Yu Chen, Qinbin Li, Arash Nourian, Sanmi Koyejo, Bo Li

AI总结:

本文探究联邦学习抵御投毒攻击中差分隐私与认证鲁棒性的联系,提出利用DPFL隐私特性提供认证预测与攻击无效性标准,并发现隐私增强可提升攻击无效性,但需平衡隐私与效用以优化预测认证。

摘要:

联邦学习(FL)提供了一种高效的范式,可以利用分布式用户的数据联合训练全局模型。由于本地训练数据来自可能不可信的不同用户,多项研究表明FL容易受到投毒攻击。同时,为了保护本地用户的隐私,FL通常以差分隐私方式(DPFL)进行训练。因此,在本文中,我们提出以下问题:在FL抵御投毒攻击中,差分隐私与认证鲁棒性之间的潜在联系是什么?我们能否利用DPFL固有的隐私特性为FL提供认证鲁棒性?我们能否进一步提高FL的隐私性以增强此类鲁棒性认证?我们首先研究了FL的用户级和实例级隐私,并提供了正式的隐私分析以实现改进的实例级隐私。然后,我们提供了两个鲁棒性认证标准:认证预测和认证攻击无效性,适用于用户级和实例级的DPFL。理论上,我们基于这两个标准,在给定有界数量的恶意用户或实例的情况下,提供了DPFL的认证鲁棒性。实证上,我们进行了大量实验,在不同数据集上的一系列投毒攻击下验证了我们的理论。我们发现,提高DPFL中的隐私保护水平会导致更强的认证攻击无效性;然而,这并不必然导致更强的认证预测。因此,实现最优的认证预测需要在隐私和效用损失之间取得适当的平衡。

英文摘要:

Federated learning (FL) provides an efficient paradigm to jointly train a global model leveraging data from distributed users. As local training data comes from different users who may not be trustworthy, several studies have shown that FL is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Meanwhile, to protect the privacy of local users, FL is usually trained in a differentially private way (DPFL). Thus, in this paper, we ask: What are the underlying connections between differential privacy and certified robustness in FL against poisoning attacks? Can we leverage the innate privacy property of DPFL to provide certified robustness for FL? Can we further improve the privacy of FL to improve such robustness certification? We first investigate both user-level and instance-level privacy of FL and provide formal privacy analysis to achieve improved instance-level privacy. We then provide two robustness certification criteria: certified prediction and certified attack inefficacy for DPFL on both user and instance levels. Theoretically, we provide the certified robustness of DPFL based on both criteria given a bounded number of adversarial users or instances. Empirically, we conduct extensive experiments to verify our theories under a range of poisoning attacks on different datasets. We find that increasing the level of privacy protection in DPFL results in stronger certified attack inefficacy; however, it does not necessarily lead to a stronger certified prediction. Thus, achieving the optimal certified prediction requires a proper balance between privacy and utility loss.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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