In our time cybersecurity has grown to be a topic of massive proportion at the national and enterprise levels. Our thesis is that the economic perspective and investment decision-making are vital factors in determining the outcome of the struggle. To build our economic framework, we borrow from the pioneering work of Gordon and Loeb in which the Defender optimally trades-off investments for lower likelihood of its system breach. Our two-sided model additionally has an Attacker, assumed to be rational and also guided by economic considerations in its decision-making, to which the Defender responds. Our model is a simplified adaptation of a model proposed during the Cold War for weapons deployment in the US. Our model may also be viewed as a Stackelberg game and, from an analytic perspective, as a Max-Min problem, the analysis of which is known to have to contend with discontinuous behavior. The complexity of our simple model is rooted in its inherent nonlinearity and, more consequentially, non-convexity of the objective function in the optimization. The possibilities of the Attacker's actions add substantially to the risk to the Defender, and the Defender's rational, risk-neutral optimal investments in general substantially exceed the optimal investments predicted by the one-sided Gordon-Loeb model. We obtain a succinct set of three decision types that categorize all of the Defender's optimal investment decisions. Also, the Defender's optimal decisions exhibit discontinuous behavior as the initial vulnerability of its system is varied. The analysis is supplemented by extensive numerical illustrations. The results from our model open several major avenues for future work.
The cybersecurity technological landscape is a complex ecosystem in which entities -- such as companies and technologies -- influence each other in a non-trivial manner. Measuring the influence between entities is a tenet for informed technological investments in critical infrastructure. To study the mutual influence of companies and technologies from the cybersecurity field, we consider a bi-partite graph that links both sets of entities. Each node in this graph is weighted by applying a recursive algorithm based on the method of reflection. This endeavor helps to measure the impact of an ent…
AI in Cyberpsychology: A systematic literature review of Cybersecurity enhancement by using AI for analyzing psychology of Victims, Attackers, and Defenders
Istanbul Medipol University（伊斯坦布尔梅迪波尔大学）；Atlas University（阿塔斯大学）；University of Calgary（卡尔加里大学）；University of Southern Denmark（南部丹麦大学）
A model of strategy formulation is used to study how an adaptive attacker learns to overcome a moving target cyber defense. The attacker-defender interaction is modeled as a game in which a defender deploys a temporal platform migration defense. Against this defense, a population of attackers develop strategies specifying the temporal ordering of resource investments that bring targeted zero-day exploits into existence. Attacker response to two defender temporal platform migration scheduling policies are examined. In the first defender scheduling policy, the defender selects the active platfor…
One of the widely used cyber deception techniques is decoying, where defenders create fictitious machines (i.e., honeypots) to lure attackers. Honeypots are deployed to entice attackers, but their effectiveness depends on their configuration as that would influence whether attackers will judge them as "real" machines or not. In this work, we study two-sided deception, where we manipulate the observed configuration of both honeypots and real machines. The idea is to improve cyberdefense by either making honeypots ``look like'' real machines or by making real machines ``look like honeypots.'"We …
In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In order to give defenders an advantage, it is important to understand an attacker's motivation and their likely next best action. As a first step in modeling this behavior, we introduce a security game framework that simulates interplay between attackers and defenders in a noisy environment, focusing on the factors that drive decision making for attackers and defenders in the variants of the game with full knowledge and ob…
Cyberattacks on both databases and critical infrastructure have threatened public and private sectors. Ubiquitous tracking and wearable computing have infringed upon privacy. Advocates and engineers have recently proposed using defensive deception as a means to leverage the information asymmetry typically enjoyed by attackers as a tool for defenders. The term deception, however, has been employed broadly and with a variety of meanings. In this paper, we survey 24 articles from 2008-2018 that use game theory to model defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy. Then we propose a taxonomy …
Identifying the actual adversarial threat against a system vulnerability has been a long-standing challenge for cybersecurity research. To determine an optimal strategy for the defender, game-theoretic based decision models have been widely used to simulate the real-world attacker-defender scenarios while taking the defender's constraints into consideration. In this work, we focus on understanding human attacker behaviors in order to optimize the defender's strategy. To achieve this goal, we model attacker-defender engagements as Markov Games and search for their Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibri…
We study the security of large-scale cyber-physical systems (CPS) consisting of multiple interdependent subsystems, each managed by a different defender. Defenders invest their security budgets with the goal of thwarting the spread of cyber attacks to their critical assets. We model the security investment decisions made by the defenders as a security game. While prior work has used security games to analyze such scenarios, we propose behavioral security games, in which defenders exhibit characteristics of human decision making that have been identified in behavioral economics as representing …
Tulane University（杜兰大学）；The Ohio State University（俄亥俄州立大学）；University of California, Davis（加利福尼亚大学戴维斯分校）
Cybersecurity is increasingly threatened by advanced and persistent attacks. As these attacks are often designed to disable a system (or a critical resource, e.g., a user account) repeatedly, it is crucial for the defender to keep updating its security measures to strike a balance between the risk of being compromised and the cost of security updates. Moreover, these decisions often need to be made with limited and delayed feedback due to the stealthy nature of advanced attacks. In addition to targeted attacks, such an optimal timing policy under incomplete information has broad applications i…
In cybersecurity, attackers range from brash, unsophisticated script kiddies and cybercriminals to stealthy, patient advanced persistent threats. When modeling these attackers, we can observe that they demonstrate different risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviors. This work explores how an attacker's risk seeking or risk averse behavior affects their operations against detection-optimizing defenders in an Internet of Things ecosystem. Using an evaluation framework which uses real, parametrizable malware, we develop a game that is played by a defender against attackers with a suite of malware th…
Purdue University（普渡大学）；Ohio State University（俄亥俄州立大学）；Qatar Computing Research Institute（卡塔尔计算研究所）
We model the behavioral biases of human decision-making in securing interdependent systems and show that such behavioral decision-making leads to a suboptimal pattern of resource allocation compared to non-behavioral (rational) decision-making. We provide empirical evidence for the existence of such behavioral bias model through a controlled subject study with 145 participants. We then propose three learning techniques for enhancing decision-making in multi-round setups. We illustrate the benefits of our decision-making model through multiple interdependent real-world systems and quantify the …
Learning to Defend by Attacking (and Vice-Versa): Transfer of Learning in Cybersecurity Games
Carnegie Mellon University（卡内基梅隆大学）；Social and Decision Sciences Department（社会与决策科学系）；dept. Social and Decision Sciences（社会与决策科学系）；dept. Software and Societal Systems（软件与社会系统系）
University of Houston（休斯顿大学）；University of Greenwich（格林威治大学）；Pennsylvania State University（宾夕法尼亚州立大学）
In the wake of a cybersecurity incident, it is crucial to promptly discover how the threat actors breached security in order to assess the impact of the incident and to develop and deploy countermeasures that can protect against further attacks. To this end, defenders can launch a cyber-forensic investigation, which discovers the techniques that the threat actors used in the incident. A fundamental challenge in such an investigation is prioritizing the investigation of particular techniques since the investigation of each technique requires time and effort, but forensic analysts cannot know wh…
