福利的边际劳动供给抑制因素:来自参与的行政障碍的证据
The Marginal Labor Supply Disincentives of Welfare: Evidence from Administrative Barriers to Participation
摘要:
现有的研究静态影响的操纵福利计划的利益参数对劳动力供给只允许限制性形式的异质性偏好。然而,偏好异质性意味着福利扩张和收缩对劳动力供给的边际效应在不同的时间段和不同的人口中可能会有所不同,并且会影响偏好分布的不同部分。一个新的研究AFDC计划使用的变化,在国家一级的行政障碍,进入该计划在20世纪80年代末和90年代初,以估计边际劳动力供给的变化引起的参与计划的影响。这些估计是从一个理论一致的简化形式模型,允许福利计划参与的变化如何影响劳动力供应的利润率的非参数规格。使用局部工具变量形式的估计表明,边际处理效应是二次的,随着参与率的上升而上升,然后下降(即,在工作时间上变得更消极,然后不那么消极)。平均而言,工作抑制因素并不大,但这掩盖了一些影响接近于零的边际,以及一些相当大的边际。传统的IV估计了边际效应的加权平均值,给出了边际响应的误导性图片。一个反事实的练习,适用于1967年,1981年和1996年的三个历史改革时期的估计时,该计划的税率显着改变表明,边际劳动力供给的反应不同,因为在每个时期的参与水平和谁是该计划的组成的差异。
英文摘要:
Existing research on the static effects of the manipulation of welfare program benefit parameters on labor supply has allowed only restrictive forms of heterogeneity in preferences. Yet preference heterogeneity implies that the marginal effects on labor supply of welfare expansions and contractions may differ in different time periods with different populations and which sweep out different portions of the distribution of preferences. A new examination of the heavily studied AFDC program uses variation in state-level administrative barriers to entering the program in the late 1980s and early 1990s to estimate the marginal labor supply effects of changes in program participation induced by that variation. The estimates are obtained from a theory-consistent reduced form model which allows for a nonparametric specification of how changes in welfare program participation affect labor supply on the margin. Estimates using a form of local instrumental variables show that the marginal treatment effects are quadratic, rising and then falling as participation rates rise (i.e., becoming more negative then less negative on hours of work). The average work disincentive is not large but that masks some margins where effects are close to zero and some which are sizable. Traditional IV which estimates a weighted average of marginal effects gives a misleading picture of marginal responses. A counterfactual exercise which applies the estimates to three historical reform periods in 1967, 1981, and 1996 when the program tax rate was significantly altered shows that marginal labor supply responses differed in each period because of differences in the level of participation in the period and the composition of who was on the program.
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