供应链约束下大负荷的容量市场
Capacity Markets for Large Loads under Supply-Chain Constraints
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文针对带共享供应链约束的大负荷容量市场，开发模型评估BYOC指令与灵活性认证的福利效应，发现二者收益受供应链压力影响，且对相邻市场的溢出效应不同。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
受数据中心快速增长的驱动，我们开发了一个模型，用于评估存在共享供应链约束的新型大负荷容量市场中的自带容量（BYOC）指令与灵活性认证。在有效定价下，BYOC主要在电网建设容量与自建容量之间重新分配采购，因此几乎无福利效应；而灵活性通过降低有效容量要求带来适度收益。在行政价格上限下，指令可通过迫使数据中心将容量的全部成本内部化来提升静态福利。两种工具的福利排序取决于供应链压力：低或中度压力下，仅灵活性工具提升福利；在价格上限的严重压力下，BYOC义务的福利收益可超过灵活性的总收益。两种工具对相邻市场的影响不同：单边BYOC指令会挤出其容量投资，而在我们的校准基准下，灵活性基本无溢出效应。最后，将当前容量非性能惩罚应用于灵活负荷，可能导致财务激励过弱，无法诱导真实的灵活性报告。
英文摘要
Motivated by the rapid growth of data centers, we develop a model to evaluate bringyour-own-capacity (BYOC) mandates and flexibility accreditation in capacity markets for new large loads with shared supply-chain constraints. With efficient pricing, BYOC mainly reallocates procurement between grid-built and self-built capacity and therefore has little welfare effect, while flexibility delivers a modest gain by reducing the effective capacity requirement. Under administrative price caps, mandates can improve static welfare by forcing data centers to internalize the full cost of capacity. The welfare ranking of the two instruments depends on supply-chain stress. At low or moderate stress, only the flexibility instrument raises welfare. Under severe stress with capped prices, the welfare gain from the BYOC obligation can exceed the gross flexibility benefit. The two instruments differ in their effects on a neighboring market: a unilateral BYOC mandate can crowd out its capacity investment, while flexibility produces essentially no spillover at our calibrated benchmark. Finally, applying current capacity non-performance penalties to flexible loads may lead to financial incentives that are too weak to induce truthful flexibility reporting.
