阿根廷失业保险的福利影响。根据转账时间表的变动作出的新估计数
The welfare effects of unemployment insurance in Argentina. New estimates using changes in the schedule of transfers
摘要：
失业保险转移支付应在向失业者提供消费与抑制求职行为之间取得平衡。发展中国家面临着非正规性的额外挑战。劳动者可以选择在非正规工作中隐藏自己的就业状态和劳动收入，这是另一种形式的道德风险。为了证明这一政策在一个受非正规性影响的国家的影响，我们利用阿根廷转移时间表中的扭结。我们的研究结果表明，更高的福利诱导适度的行为反应，在找工作率和增加再就业工资。我们使用一个充分的统计公式，从一个模型与随机工资提供，我们校准它与我们的估计。我们表明，福利可以大幅增加，如果在阿根廷的福利增加。重要的是，我们的结论是相关的中位数合格的工人，这是受非正式的强烈影响。
英文摘要：
Unemployment insurance transfers should balance the provision of consumption to the unemployed with the disincentive effects on the search behavior. Developing countries face the additional challenge of informality. Workers can choose to hide their employment state and labor income in informal jobs, an additional form of moral hazard. To provide evidence about the effects of this policy in a country affected by informality we exploit kinks in the schedule of transfers in Argentina. Our results suggest that higher benefits induce moderate behavioral responses in job-finding rates and increase re-employment wages. We use a sufficient statistics formula from a model with random wage offers and we calibrate it with our estimates. We show that welfare could rise substantially if benefits were increased in Argentina. Importantly, our conclusion is relevant for the median eligible worker that is strongly affected by informality.
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