带信号传递的匹配市场中的单调均衡
Monotone Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Signaling
AI总结：
本文在连续统异质主体的一对一匹配市场中引入竞争性信号均衡，研究了强单调均衡条件，证明其与Criterion D1的等价性，并完整刻画了拟线性效用下唯一的强单调CSE及其存在性。
摘要：
我们在具有连续统异质发送者和接收者的一对一匹配市场中引入了竞争性信号均衡（CSE）的概念。随后我们研究了单调CSE，其中均衡结果——发送者行动、接收者反应、信念和匹配——在更强的集合序下均是单调的。我们证明，若发送者效用是单调超模的且接收者效用是弱单调超模的，则一个CSE为强单调的当且仅当它通过Criterion D1（Cho和Kreps (1987)，Banks和Sobel (1987)）。给定接收者可采取的任何可行反应区间，我们完整刻画了唯一的强单调CSE，并证明了其在拟线性效用函数下的存在性。
英文摘要：
We introduce a notion of competitive signaling equilibrium (CSE) in one-to-one matching markets with a continuum of heterogeneous senders and receivers. We then study monotone CSE where equilibrium outcomes - sender actions, receiver reactions, beliefs, and matching - are all monotone in the stronger set order. We show that if the sender utility is monotone-supermodular and the receiver's utility is weakly monotone-supermodular, a CSE is stronger monotone if and only if it passes Criterion D1 (Cho and Kreps (1987), Banks and Sobel (1987)). Given any interval of feasible reactions that receivers can take, we fully characterize a unique stronger monotone CSE and establishes its existence with quasilinear utility functions.
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