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作为信号的弃权:AI不断改进下的信任品市场中保留的人类技能、责任与能力信号

The Fallback as Signal: Preserved Human Skill, Liability, and Competence Signaling in Credence-Good Markets under Improving AI

Andreas Bauer

arXiv 2608.04276首次发表:更新:

发表机构

Bauer Advanced Network Solutions KG(鲍尔高级网络解决方案有限公司)

机构由 AI 辅助整理,请以论文原文为准。

AI 中文总结

该研究针对AI改进但仍不完善时企业的人类员工参与决策问题,构建基于主体的市场模型再现相关分析阈值,揭示信任品市场中人类技能等信号的保留机制。

AI 中文摘要

部署着不断改进但仍不完善的AI的企业必须决定让人类员工参与的程度。基于主体的市场模型再现了带噪声信念、记录学习和员工流动下的分析阈值。

英文摘要

Providers deploying imperfect AI must decide how much to keep humans engaged: engagement costs output but builds the fallback skill needed when it fails. A liability pledge whose expected cost falls in that skill restores single crossing on a type that is neither drawn nor embodied once in a good, but built, decaying and poachable. One engagement decision thus produces both the client-facing signal and the trajectory on which mobile workers sort. That conjunction is what is new. It yields a two-sided band of served work, a stakes threshold above which building beats free-riding, and a signal that never dies.

Comments30 pages plus 21-page supplement, 8 figures. v4: Proposition 2 corrected (participation threshold below which types pool), explicit pricing assumption, agent-based market rebuilt, new figure on certification vs rival quality; Propositions 4-8 restated with explicit conditions; introduction and literature rewritten. Replication: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.33317559

论文原文

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