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arXiv 2107.09976physics.soc-phnlin.AO
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从网络连接性预测合作级别的转变

Predicting transitions in cooperation levels from network connectivity

A. Zhuk, I. Sendiña-Nadal, I. Leyva, D. Musatov, A. M. Raigorodskii, M. Perc, S. Boccaletti

摘要:

网络决定了我们的社交圈以及我们与他人合作的方式。我们知道,拓扑特征,如枢纽和度的重复性会影响合作,我们知道,如果利他行为的收益除以成本超过邻居的平均数量,合作是有利的。然而,一个简单的规则,将预测合作过渡的任意网络尚未提出。在这里,我们表明,在一个网络中的度的唯一序列可以用来预测在哪些游戏参数的合作水平的主要变化,可以预期,包括相变从吸收到混合策略阶段。我们在随机和无标度网络上使用进化囚徒困境博弈来证明预测,以及它的局限性和可能的陷阱。我们观察到良好的协议的预测和结果获得的并发和蒙特卡洛方法更新的战略,从而提供了一个简单而快速的方法来估计结果的进化社会困境的任意网络,而不需要实际玩游戏。

英文摘要:

Networks determine our social circles and the way we cooperate with others. We know that topological features like hubs and degree assortativity affect cooperation, and we know that cooperation is favoured if the benefit of the altruistic act divided by the cost exceeds the average number of neighbours. However, a simple rule that would predict cooperation transitions on an arbitrary network has not yet been presented. Here we show that the unique sequence of degrees in a network can be used to predict at which game parameters major shifts in the level of cooperation can be expected, including phase transitions from absorbing to mixed strategy phases. We use the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on random and scale-free networks to demonstrate the prediction, as well as its limitations and possible pitfalls. We observe good agreements between the predictions and the results obtained with concurrent and Monte Carlo methods for the update of the strategies, thus providing a simple and fast way to estimate the outcome of evolutionary social dilemmas on arbitrary networks without the need of actually playing the game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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