arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2107.06002econ.GNq-fin.EC
收藏

有限信息条件下隐藏动作情境中的微观动力学

Micro-level dynamics in hidden action situations with limited information

Stephan Leitner, Friederike Wall

摘要:

隐藏行动模型提供了一个最佳的共享规则的情况下,一个主要的任务分配给一个代理谁努力执行分配给他的任务。然而,委托人只能观察任务结果,而不能观察代理人的实际行动,这就是为什么共享规则只能基于结果。隐藏行动模型建立在对委托人和代理人与信息访问相关的能力的某种理想化假设之上。我们提出了一个基于代理的模型,放松这些假设。我们的分析特别关注信息获取受限引发的微观层面的动态。对于主要的领域,我们确定了所谓的西西弗斯效应,解释了为什么共享规则,提供了激励代理人采取最佳行动是难以实现的,如果信息是有限的,我们确定的因素,缓和这种效果。此外,我们分析了代理领域的行为动力学。我们表明,代理人可能会作出更多的努力比最佳的无限访问信息,我们称之为多余的努力。有趣的是,委托人可以通过激励机制控制做出超额努力的概率。然而,代理人最终付出了多少额外的努力,这是委托人无法直接控制的。

英文摘要:

The hidden-action model provides an optimal sharing rule for situations in which a principal assigns a task to an agent who makes an effort to carry out the task assigned to him. However, the principal can only observe the task outcome but not the agent's actual action, which is why the sharing rule can only be based on the outcome. The hidden-action model builds on somewhat idealized assumptions about the principal's and the agent's capabilities related to information access. We propose an agent-based model that relaxes some of these assumptions. Our analysis lays particular focus on the micro-level dynamics triggered by limited access to information. For the principal's sphere, we identify the so-called Sisyphus effect that explains why the sharing rule that provides the agent with incentives to take optimal action is difficult to achieve if the information is limited, and we identify factors that moderate this effect. In addition, we analyze the behavioral dynamics in the agent's sphere. We show that the agent might make even more of an effort than optimal under unlimited access to information, which we refer to as excess effort. Interestingly, the principal can control the probability of making an excess effort via the incentive mechanism. However, how much excess effort the agent finally makes is out of the principal's direct control.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑