有限记忆和异质记忆对隐藏动作情境的影响
Effects of limited and heterogeneous memory in hidden-action situations
摘要:
决策者的有限记忆在经济模型中常常被忽视,尽管可以合理地假设它会显著影响模型的结果。Holmström引入的隐藏行动模型也包含了这一假设。在委托人和代理人之间的委托关系中,该模型提供了使双方效用最大化的结果的最优共享规则。本文介绍了一个基于代理的模型的隐藏行动的问题,包括缔约方的认知能力的限制。我们的分析主要集中在委托人和代理人的效用对放松假设的敏感性。研究结果表明,代理人的效用下降与限制在委托人的认知能力。此外,我们发现,代理人的认知能力的限制既不影响他也不影响委托人的效用。因此,药剂承担了认知能力限制所导致的所有不良影响。
英文摘要:
Limited memory of decision-makers is often neglected in economic models, although it is reasonable to assume that it significantly influences the models' outcomes. The hidden-action model introduced by Holmström also includes this assumption. In delegation relationships between a principal and an agent, this model provides the optimal sharing rule for the outcome that optimizes both parties' utilities. This paper introduces an agent-based model of the hidden-action problem that includes limitations in the cognitive capacity of contracting parties. Our analysis mainly focuses on the sensitivity of the principal's and the agent's utilities to the relaxed assumptions. The results indicate that the agent's utility drops with limitations in the principal's cognitive capacity. Also, we find that the agent's cognitive capacity limitations affect neither his nor the principal's utility. Thus, the agent bears all adverse effects resulting from limitations in cognitive capacity.
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