隐藏行动设置中的决策促进信息:基于代理的方法
Decision-facilitating information in hidden-action setups: An agent-based approach
摘要:
隐藏行动模型抓住了委托代理理论的一个基本问题,并提供了一个最佳的共享规则时,只有结果,而不是努力可以观察到。然而,隐藏行动模型建立在各种明确的和隐含的关于缔约方信息的假设之上。本文放松关键假设的信息的可用性,包括在隐藏的行动模型,以研究是否,如果是这样的话,如何快速实现最佳共享规则,这是如何影响的委托代理关系中采用的各种类型的信息。我们的分析特别侧重于有关环境的信息和代理的可行行动。我们遵循一种方法,将封闭形式的数学模型转换为基于代理的计算模型,并表明,如果决策者充分了解环境,执行任务的可行选项的信息的程度只会对性能产生影响,并且在搜索新的可行选项时,是否进行探索或开发的决定只会影响特定情况下的性能。相反,掌握关于环境的良好信息似乎在几乎所有情况下都至关重要。
英文摘要:
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and also implicit assumptions about the information of the contracting parties. This paper relaxes key assumptions regarding the availability of information included in the hidden-action model in order to study whether and, if so, how fast the optimal sharing rule is achieved and how this is affected by the various types of information employed in the principal-agent relation. Our analysis particularly focuses on information about the environment and about feasible actions for the agent. We follow an approach to transfer closed-form mathematical models into agent-based computational models and show that the extent of information about feasible options to carry out a task only has an impact on performance if decision makers are well informed about the environment, and that the decision whether to perform exploration or exploitation when searching for new feasible options only affects performance in specific situations. Having good information about the environment, on the contrary, appears to be crucial in almost all situations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。