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arXiv 2106.12977econ.TH
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唯一稳定匹配

Unique Stable Matchings

Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary, Anders Yeo

AI总结:

本文针对一对一双边匹配市场的唯一稳定匹配问题,证明原市场存在唯一稳定匹配、对应标准型市场偏好无环、标准型市场参与者偏好列表均为单元素集三者等价。

摘要:

本文研究Gale和Shapley(1962)定义的一对一双边匹配市场中的唯一预测问题,并证明如下结论。定理:设P为一个一对一双边匹配市场,P*为其对应的标准型——一个(弱)更小、且稳定匹配集合与P相同的匹配市场,可通过Irving和Leather(1986)以及Balinski和Ratier(1997)提出的步骤得到。以下三个命题等价:(a) P存在唯一稳定匹配;(b) P*上的偏好是无环的,无环定义由Chung(2000)提出;(c) 在P*中,每个市场参与者的偏好列表均为单元素集。

英文摘要:

In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be its associated normal form, a (weakly) smaller matching market with the same set of stable matchings, that can be obtained using procedures introduced in Irving and Leather (1986) and Balinski and Ratier (1997). The following three statements are equivalent (a) P has a unique stable matching. (b) Preferences on P* are acyclic, as defined by Chung (2000). (c) In P* every market participant's preference list is a singleton.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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