劳动力非正规化与信贷市场准入
Labor Informality and Credit Market Accessibility
摘要：
本文考察了信贷市场发展对非正规部门和正规部门劳动力流动的影响。在俄罗斯，由于没有信用评分系统，正式的贷款人可以根据核实的收入数额设定信用限额。为了获得贷款，非正规工人必须首先使其收入正规化（转为正式工作），然后申请贷款。为了说明这一机制，利用RLMS数据，实证方法是就业的动态多项logit模型。实证结果表明，放松信贷约束增加了从非正式工作过渡到正式工作的可能性，并改善CMA（由一个标准差）增加了非正式部门的工人正规化的机会5.4个百分点。这些结果在不同规格的模型中是稳健的。政策模拟显示，在信贷受限的社区，为应对更好的CMA，大力支持减少非正规就业。
英文摘要：
The paper investigates the effects of the credit market development on the labor mobility between the informal and formal labor sectors. In the case of Russia, due to the absence of a credit score system, a formal lender may set a credit limit based on the verified amount of income. To get a loan, an informal worker must first formalize his or her income (switch to a formal job), and then apply for a loan. To show this mechanism, the RLMS data was utilized, and the empirical method is the dynamic multinomial logit model of employment. The empirical results show that a relaxation of credit constraints increases the probability of transition from an informal to a formal job, and improved CMA (by one standard deviation) increases the chances of informal sector workers to formalize by 5.4 ppt. These results are robust in different specifications of the model. Policy simulations show strong support for a reduction in informal employment in response to better CMA in credit-constrained communities.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
