Incentive mechanism design is crucial for enabling federated learning. We deal with clustering problem of agents contributing to federated learning setting. Assuming agents behave selfishly, we model their interaction as a stable coalition partition problem using hedonic games where agents and clusters are the players and coalitions, respectively. We address the following question: is there a family of hedonic games ensuring a Nash-stable coalition partition? We propose the Nash-stable set which determines the family of hedonic games possessing at least one Nash-stable partition, and analyze the conditions of non-emptiness of the Nash-stable set. Besides, we deal with the decentralized clustering. We formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game and prove the existence of a potential game.
Gran Sasso Science Institute（格兰萨索科学研究所）；University of L’Aquila（拉奎拉大学）；University of Warsaw（华沙大学）
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion on this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if they belong to different partitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare their preferences strategically in order to maximize their ben…
Crowdsourcing is a favorable computing paradigm for processing computer-hard tasks by harnessing human intelligence. However, generic crowdsourcing systems may lead to privacy-leakage through the sharing of worker data. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach, called iFedCrowd (incentive-boosted Federated Crowdsourcing), to manage the privacy and quality of crowdsourcing projects. iFedCrowd allows participants to locally process sensitive data and only upload encrypted training models, and then aggregates the model parameters to build a shared server model to protect data privacy. …
The emerging industrial metaverses realize the mapping and expanding operations of physical industry into virtual space for significantly upgrading intelligent manufacturing. The industrial metaverses obtain data from various production and operation lines by Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), and thus conduct effective data analysis and decision-making, thereby enhancing the production efficiency of the physical space, reducing operating costs, and maximizing commercial value. However, there still exist bottlenecks when integrating metaverses into IIoT, such as the privacy leakage of sensi…
Northeastern University（东北大学）；HKUST（香港科技大学）；Hong Kong Baptist University（香港浸会大学）
Federated learning utilizes various resources provided by participants to collaboratively train a global model, which potentially address the data privacy issue of machine learning. In such promising paradigm, the performance will be deteriorated without sufficient training data and other resources in the learning process. Thus, it is quite crucial to inspire more participants to contribute their valuable resources with some payments for federated learning. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of incentive schemes for federate learning. Specifically, we identify the incentive probl…
Federated learning makes it possible for all parties with data isolation to train the model collaboratively and efficiently while satisfying privacy protection. To obtain a high-quality model, an incentive mechanism is necessary to motivate more high-quality workers with data and computing power. The existing incentive mechanisms are applied in offline scenarios, where the task publisher collects all bids and selects workers before the task. However, it is practical that different workers arrive online in different orders before or during the task. Therefore, we propose a reverse auction-based…
Nanyang Technological University（南洋理工大学）；University of Electronic Science and Technology of China（电子科技大学）；Sungkyunkwan University（成均馆大学）
To strengthen data privacy and security, federated learning as an emerging machine learning technique is proposed to enable large-scale nodes, e.g., mobile devices, to distributedly train and globally share models without revealing their local data. This technique can not only significantly improve privacy protection for mobile devices, but also ensure good performance of the trained results collectively. Currently, most the existing studies focus on optimizing federated learning algorithms to improve model training performance. However, incentive mechanisms to motivate the mobile devices to j…
Northeastern University（东北大学）；Hong Kong Baptist University（香港浸会大学）
Promising federated learning coupled with Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is considered as one of the most promising solutions to the AI-driven service provision. Plenty of studies focus on federated learning from the performance and security aspects, but they neglect the incentive mechanism. In MEC, edge nodes would not like to voluntarily participate in learning, and they differ in the provision of multi-dimensional resources, both of which might deteriorate the performance of federated learning. Also, lightweight schemes appeal to edge nodes in MEC. These features require the incentive mechanis…
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics（南京航空航天大学）；PHENIKAA University（维新大学）；Nanyang Technological University（南洋理工大学）
Federated learning (FL) becomes popular and has shown great potentials in training large-scale machine learning (ML) models without exposing the owners' raw data. In FL, the data owners can train ML models based on their local data and only send the model updates rather than raw data to the model owner for aggregation. To improve learning performance in terms of model accuracy and training completion time, it is essential to recruit sufficient participants. Meanwhile, the data owners are rational and may be unwilling to participate in the collaborative learning process due to the resource cons…
Federated learning provides a promising paradigm for collecting machine learning models from distributed data sources without compromising users' data privacy. The success of a credible federated learning system builds on the assumption that the decentralized and self-interested users will be willing to participate to contribute their local models in a trustworthy way. However, without proper incentives, users might simply opt out the contribution cycle, or will be mis-incentivized to contribute spam/false information. This paper introduces solutions to incentivize truthful reporting of a loca…
Federated Learning is an emerging distributed collaborative learning paradigm used by many of applications nowadays. The effectiveness of federated learning relies on clients' collective efforts and their willingness to contribute local data. However, due to privacy concerns and the costs of data collection and model training, clients may not always contribute all the data they possess, which would negatively affect the performance of the global model. This paper presents an incentive mechanism that encourages clients to contribute as much data as they can obtain. Unlike previous incentive mec…
Incentives that compensate for the involved costs in the decentralized training of a Federated Learning (FL) model act as a key stimulus for clients' long-term participation. However, it is challenging to convince clients for quality participation in FL due to the absence of: (i) full information on the client's data quality and properties; (ii) the value of client's data contributions; and (iii) the trusted mechanism for monetary incentive offers. This often leads to poor efficiency in training and communication. While several works focus on strategic incentive designs and client selection to…
Design of Two-Level Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Federated Learning
Nanjing University of Science and Technology（南京理工大学）；Hainan University（海南大学）；The Hong Kong Polytechnic University（香港理工大学）；East China Normal University（华东师范大学）；Shanghai Jiao Tong University（上海交通大学）
Kyung Hee University（庆熙大学）；The University of Sydney（悉尼大学）；University of Houston（休斯顿大学）
Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning framework that can deal with the distributed issue in machine learning and still guarantee high learning performance. However, it is impractical that all users will sacrifice their resources to join the FL algorithm. This motivates us to study the incentive mechanism design for FL. In this paper, we consider a FL system that involves one base station (BS) and multiple mobile users. The mobile users use their own data to train the local machine learning model, and then send the trained models to the BS, which generates the initial model, collect…
Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago（芝加哥丰田理工学院）；University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）；Cornell University（康奈尔大学）
In recent years, federated learning has been embraced as an approach for bringing about collaboration across large populations of learning agents. However, little is known about how collaboration protocols should take agents' incentives into account when allocating individual resources for communal learning in order to maintain such collaborations. Inspired by game theoretic notions, this paper introduces a framework for incentive-aware learning and data sharing in federated learning. Our stable and envy-free equilibria capture notions of collaboration in the presence of agents interested in m…
Federated learning (FL) is a paradigm that allows distributed clients to learn a shared machine learning model without sharing their sensitive training data. While largely decentralized, FL requires resources to fund a central orchestrator or to reimburse contributors of datasets to incentivize participation. Inspired by insights from prior-independent auction design, we propose a mechanism, FIPIA (Federated Incentive Payments via Prior-Independent Auctions), to collect monetary contributions from self-interested clients. The mechanism operates in the semi-honest trust model and works even if …
Federated Learning Incentive Mechanism under Buyers' Auction Market
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China（电子科技大学）；Beihang University（北京航空航天大学）；National Taiwan University（台湾大学）；Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics（江西财经大学）
JSAM: Privacy Straggler-Resilient Joint Client Selection and Incentive Mechanism Design in Differentially Private Federated Learning
Department of Information Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong（信息工程系，香港中文大学）；School of Science and Engineering, Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Society（科学与工程学院，深圳人工智能与机器人研究院）；The Chinese University of Hong Kong（香港中文大学）
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis（印第安纳大学-普渡大学印第安纳波利斯分校）；Bowling Green State University（鲍灵格林州立大学）；Shandong University（山东大学）
Blockchain-based federated learning (BCFL) has recently gained tremendous attention because of its advantages such as decentralization and privacy protection of raw data. However, there has been few research focusing on the allocation of resources for clients in BCFL. In the BCFL framework where the FL clients and the blockchain miners are the same devices, clients broadcast the trained model updates to the blockchain network and then perform mining to generate new blocks. Since each client has a limited amount of computing resources, the problem of allocating computing resources into training…
Incentive Mechanism Design for Unbiased Federated Learning with Randomized Client Participation
Duke Kunshan University（昆山杜克大学）；The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen（香港中文大学（深圳））；Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Society（深圳市人工智能与机器人研究院）；IBM T. J. Watson Research Center（IBM托马斯·J·沃森研究中心）；Yale University（耶鲁大学）
IMFL-AIGC: Incentive Mechanism Design for Federated Learning Empowered by Artificial Intelligence Generated Content
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University（中山大学计算机科学与工程学院）；Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（香港科技大学电子与计算机工程学系）
Federated Learning for Data Market: Shapley-UCB for Seller Selection and Incentives
School of Intelligent Systems Engineering, Sun Yat-Sen University（中山大学智能系统工程学院）；Department of Computing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University（香港理工大学计算机系）
Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in the related hedonic games has received much attention, but only from the perspective of coalition stability, with little emphasis on the mechanism design objectives of true preference elicitation, social welfare, and equity. We present the first formal mechanism design framework for team formation, building on recent combinatorial matching market design liter…
Meta-Computing Enhanced Federated Learning in IIoT: Satisfaction-Aware Incentive Scheme via DRL-Based Stackelberg Game
Guangxi University Key Laboratory of Intelligent Networking and Scenario System (School of Information and Communication, Guilin University of Electronic Technology)（广西智能网络与场景系统重点实验室（信息与通信学院，桂林电子科技大学））；National Engineering Laboratory for Comprehensive Transportation Big Data Application Technology (Guangxi)（综合交通运输大数据应用技术国家工程实验室（广西））；School of Automation, Guangdong University of Technology（自动化学院，广东工业大学）；Guangxi Key Laboratory of Multimedia Communications and Network Technology, Nanning（广西多媒体通信与网络技术重点实验室，南宁）；School of Computer and Electronic Information, Guangxi University（计算机与电子信息学院，广西大学）；College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University（计算与数据科学学院，南洋理工大学）
A Bayesian Incentive Mechanism for Poison-Resilient Federated Learning
1 Department of Multidisciplinary Engineering, Texas A\&M University, College Station, TX, USA；2 Department of Statistics；3 Department of Computer Engineering, KNUST, Kumasi, Ghana；4 Department of Computer Science, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA；5 Department of Engineering Technology；Industrial Distribution, Texas A\&M University, College Station, TX, USA
Carpe Diem: Critical Learning Period-Aware Contract-Based Incentives for Federated Learning
School of Computer Science and Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, The University of Dublin（特里尼蒂学院计算机科学与统计学系，都柏林大学）；School of Electrical and Data Engineering, University of Technology Sydney（技术悉尼大学电气与数据工程系）
Blockchain-empowered Federated Learning for Healthcare Metaverses: User-centric Incentive Mechanism with Optimal Data Freshness
Guangdong University of Technology（广东工业大学）；Singapore University of Technology and Design（新加坡科技设计大学）；Nanyang Technological University（南洋理工大学）；Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics（南京航空航天大学）
Mechanism Design for Federated Learning with Non-Monotonic Network Effects
Shenzhen Loop Area Institute（深圳河套学院）；Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Society（深圳人工智能与机器人社会研究所）；School of Science and Engineering（科学与工程学院）；Data Science Research Center（数据科学研究中心）；Duke Kunshan University（杜克昆山大学）；Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Crowd Intelligence Empowered Low-Carbon Energy Network（深圳 Crowd Intelligence 赋能低碳能源网络重点实验室）；CSIJRI Joint Research Centre on Smart Energy Storage（CSIJRI 智能储能联合研究中心）；The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen（香港中文大学（深圳））
Federated learning is a distributed learning paradigm where multiple agents, each only with access to local data, jointly learn a global model. There has recently been an explosion of research aiming not only to improve the accuracy rates of federated learning, but also provide certain guarantees around social good properties such as total error. One branch of this research has taken a game-theoretic approach, and in particular, prior work has viewed federated learning as a hedonic game, where error-minimizing players arrange themselves into federating coalitions. This past work proves the exi…
Sun Yat-sen University（中山大学）；University of California Davis（加州大学戴维斯分校）
Federated learning (FL) is a promising distributed framework for collaborative artificial intelligence model training while protecting user privacy. A bootstrapping component that has attracted significant research attention is the design of incentive mechanism to stimulate user collaboration in FL. The majority of works adopt a broker-centric approach to help the central operator to attract participants and further obtain a well-trained model. Few works consider forging participant-centric collaboration among participants to pursue an FL model for their common interests, which induces dramati…
Federated learning is a setting where agents, each with access to their own data source, combine models from local data to create a global model. If agents are drawing their data from different distributions, though, federated learning might produce a biased global model that is not optimal for each agent. This means that agents face a fundamental question: should they choose the global model or their local model? We show how this situation can be naturally analyzed through the framework of coalitional game theory. We propose the following game: there are heterogeneous players with different m…
Proof of work (PoW), as the representative consensus protocol for blockchain, consumes enormous amounts of computation and energy to determine bookkeeping rights among miners but does not achieve any practical purposes. To address the drawback of PoW, we propose a novel energy-recycling consensus mechanism named platform-free proof of federated learning (PF-PoFL), which leverages the computing power originally wasted in solving hard but meaningless PoW puzzles to conduct practical federated learning (FL) tasks. Nevertheless, potential security threats and efficiency concerns may occur due to t…
DaringFed: A Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion Pricing for Online Federated Learning under Two-sided Incomplete Information
School of Computer Science and Technology, Wuhan University of Science and Technology（武汉科技大学计算机科学与技术学院）；Key Laboratory of Social Computing and Cognitive Intelligence (Dalian University of Technology), Ministry of Education, China（大连理工大学社会计算与认知智能重点实验室（教育部））；Hubei Province Key Laboratory of Intelligent Information Processing and Real-time Industrial System, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, China（湖北省智能信息处理与实时工业系统重点实验室（武汉科技大学））；College of Computer Science, Inner Mongolia University, China（内蒙古大学计算机学院）；School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, China（华中科技大学计算机科学与技术学院）；School of Automation, Southeast University, China（东南大学自动化学院）
Price-Discrimination Game for Distributed Resource Management in Federated Learning
School of Computer Science and Technology, China University of Mining and Technology（中国矿业大学计算机科学与技术学院）；Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University College London（伦敦大学学院电子与电气工程系）
Edge computing servers like cloudlets from different service providers compensate scarce computational, memory, and energy resources of mobile devices, are distributed across access networks. However, depending on the mobility pattern and dynamically varying computational requirements of associated mobile devices, cloudlets at different parts of the network become either overloaded or under-loaded. Hence, load balancing among neighboring cloudlets appears to be an essential research problem. Nonetheless, the existing load balancing frameworks are unsuitable for low-latency applications. Thus, …
Toward a Sustainable Federated Learning Ecosystem: A Practical Least Core Mechanism for Payoff Allocation
School of Information and Electronic Engineering (Sussex Artificial Intelligence Institute), Zhejiang Gongshang University（信息与电子工程学院（Sussex人工智能研究所），浙江工商大学）；School of Communications and Information Engineering, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications（通信与信息工程学院，重庆邮电大学）；School of Computer Science and Technology, University of Mining and Technology（计算机科学与技术学院，矿业大学）；School of Mechanical, Electrical and Information Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology (Beijing)（机械、电气与信息工程学院，中国矿业大学（北京））；Key Laboratory of Intelligent Mining and Robotics, Ministry of Emergency Management（智能采矿与机器人重点实验室，应急管理部）
Zhejiang University/University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign Institute（浙江大学伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟校区联合学院）；Zhejiang University（浙江大学）；Northwestern University（西北大学）
Federated learning enables machine learning algorithms to be trained over a network of multiple decentralized edge devices without requiring the exchange of local datasets. Successfully deploying federated learning requires ensuring that agents (e.g., mobile devices) faithfully execute the intended algorithm, which has been largely overlooked in the literature. In this study, we first use risk bounds to analyze how the key feature of federated learning, unbalanced and non-i.i.d. data, affects agents' incentives to voluntarily participate and obediently follow traditional federated learning alg…
