To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.
University of Colorado, Boulder（科罗拉多大学博尔德分校）；University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学）；Clemson University（克莱姆森大学）
We study incentivized exploration for the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem where the players receive compensation for exploring arms other than the greedy choice and may provide biased feedback on reward. We seek to understand the impact of this drifted reward feedback by analyzing the performance of three instantiations of the incentivized MAB algorithm: UCB, $\varepsilon$-Greedy, and Thompson Sampling. Our results show that they all achieve $\mathcal{O}(\log T)$ regret and compensation under the drifted reward, and are therefore effective in incentivizing exploration. Numerical examples are …
For sponsored search auctions, we consider contextual multi-armed bandit problem in the presence of strategic agents. In this setting, at each round, an advertising platform (center) runs an auction to select the best-suited ads relevant to the query posted by the user. It is in the best interest of the center to select an ad that has a high expected value (i.e., probability of getting a click $\times$ value it derives from a click of the ad). The probability of getting a click (CTR) is unknown to the center and depends on the user's profile (context) posting the query. Further, the value deri…
Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Games
Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées（应用数学中心）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；École polytechnique（巴黎综合理工学院）；Institut Polytechnique de Paris（巴黎理工学院）；Université Paris-Saclay（巴黎萨克雷大学）；INRIA（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；University of California, Berkeley（加州大学伯克利分校）；Ecole Normale Supérieure（高等师范学院）；PSL Research University（巴黎文理研究大学）
Microsoft Research Silicon Valley（微软研究院硅谷分院）；Cornell University（康奈尔大学）；Facebook（脸书）
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value from clicks; the value of a click is her private information. Initially, neither the auctioneer nor the advertisers have any information about the likelihood of clicks on the advertisements. The auctioneer's goal is to design a (dominant strategies) truthful mechanism that (approximately) maximizes the social welfare. If the advertisers bid their true private …
In this paper, we investigate a new multi-armed bandit (MAB) online learning model that considers real-world phenomena in many recommender systems: (i) the learning agent cannot pull the arms by itself and thus has to offer rewards to users to incentivize arm-pulling indirectly; and (ii) if users with specific arm preferences are well rewarded, they induce a "self-reinforcing" effect in the sense that they will attract more users of similar arm preferences. Besides addressing the tradeoff of exploration and exploitation, another key feature of this new MAB model is to balance reward and incent…
Peking University（北京大学）；University of Minnesota（明尼苏达大学）；Microsoft Research（微软研究院）；Carnegie Mellon University（卡内基梅隆大学）
Consider a bandit algorithm that recommends actions to self-interested users in a recommendation system. The users are free to choose other actions and need to be incentivized to follow the algorithm's recommendations. While the users prefer to exploit, the algorithm can incentivize them to explore by leveraging the information collected from the previous users. All published work on this problem, known as incentivized exploration, focuses on small, unstructured action sets and mainly targets the case when the users' beliefs are independent across actions. However, realistic exploration proble…
COBRA: Contextual Bandit Algorithm for Ensuring Truthful Strategic Agents
Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology（新加坡-麻省理工联合研究技术联盟）；Faculty of ISEE, Kyushu University（九州大学信息科学系）；Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore（新加坡国立大学计算机科学系）
University of Virginia（弗吉尼亚大学）；The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（香港科技大学）
Incentivized exploration in multi-armed bandits (MAB) has witnessed increasing interests and many progresses in recent years, where a principal offers bonuses to agents to do explorations on her behalf. However, almost all existing studies are confined to temporary myopic agents. In this work, we break this barrier and study incentivized exploration with multiple and long-term strategic agents, who have more complicated behaviors that often appear in real-world applications. An important observation of this work is that strategic agents' intrinsic needs of learning benefit (instead of harming)…
We study a multi-round welfare-maximising mechanism design problem in instances where agents do not know their values. On each round, a mechanism first assigns an allocation each to a set of agents and charges them a price; at the end of the round, the agents provide (stochastic) feedback to the mechanism for the allocation they received. This setting is motivated by applications in cloud markets and online advertising where an agent may know her value for an allocation only after experiencing it. Therefore, the mechanism needs to explore different allocations for each agent so that it can lea…
Columbia University（哥伦比亚大学）；Massachusetts Institute of Technology（麻省理工学院）；Google Research（谷歌研究院）
In the classical contextual bandits problem, in each round $t$, a learner observes some context $c$, chooses some action $i$ to perform, and receives some reward $r_{i,t}(c)$. We consider the variant of this problem where in addition to receiving the reward $r_{i,t}(c)$, the learner also learns the values of $r_{i,t}(c')$ for some other contexts $c'$ in set $\mathcal{O}_i(c)$; i.e., the rewards that would have been achieved by performing that action under different contexts $c'\in \mathcal{O}_i(c)$. This variant arises in several strategic settings, such as learning how to bid in non-truthful …
A Semi-supervised Sensing Rate Learning based CMAB Scheme to Combat COVID-19 by Trustful Data Collection in the Crowd
Central South University（中南大学）；Hunan First Normal University（湖南第一师范学院）；Beijing Normal University（北京师范大学）；Hunan University of Science and Technology（湖南科技大学）
Strategyproof Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
ETH Zurich（苏黎世联邦理工学院）；ETH AI Center（ETH人工智能中心）；Department of Computer Science University of Oxford（牛津大学计算机科学系）；Department of Computer Science University of Warwick（Warwick大学计算机科学系）
Federated learning provides a promising paradigm for collecting machine learning models from distributed data sources without compromising users' data privacy. The success of a credible federated learning system builds on the assumption that the decentralized and self-interested users will be willing to participate to contribute their local models in a trustworthy way. However, without proper incentives, users might simply opt out the contribution cycle, or will be mis-incentivized to contribute spam/false information. This paper introduces solutions to incentivize truthful reporting of a loca…
Stanford University（斯坦福大学）；Microsoft Research NYC（微软研究院纽约）
We consider incentivized exploration: a version of multi-armed bandits where the choice of arms is controlled by self-interested agents, and the algorithm can only issue recommendations. The algorithm controls the flow of information, and the information asymmetry can incentivize the agents to explore. Prior work achieves optimal regret rates up to multiplicative factors that become arbitrarily large depending on the Bayesian priors, and scale exponentially in the number of arms. A more basic problem of sampling each arm once runs into similar factors. We focus on the price of incentives: the …
