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arXiv 2012.08388math.OCcs.SYeess.SY
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网络上自动驾驶车辆的动态驾驶和路径博弈:平均场博弈方法

Dynamic driving and routing games for autonomous vehicles on networks: A mean field game approach

Kuang Huang, Xu Chen, Xuan Di, Qiang Du

摘要:

本文旨在回答的研究问题,最优设计的决策过程中,自动驾驶汽车(AVs),包括动态选择行驶速度和路径选择的交通网络。动态交通分配(DTA)已被广泛应用于模拟出行者的路径选择或/和出发时间选择,并预测短期内的动态交通流演变。然而,现有的DTA模型并没有明确地描述一个人的选择的驾驶速度上的道路连接。驾驶速度的选择对于模拟人类驾驶员的运动可能不是至关重要的,但它是操纵自动驾驶汽车的必备控制。在本文中,我们的目标是开发一个博弈论模型来解决自动驾驶汽车的最佳驾驶策略的速度控制在内部的道路连接和路线选择在一个路口节点。为此,我们将首先重新解释的DTA问题作为一个N-车微分对策,并表明,这个游戏可以解决一般的平均场博弈论框架。由于速度控制的前向和后向结构以及路线选择的互补条件,所开发的平均场游戏具有挑战性。一个有效的算法来解决这些挑战。模型和算法在Braess网络和单目的地OW网络上进行了说明。在Braess网络上,我们首先将基于LWR的DTA模型与所提出的游戏进行比较,发现驾驶和路线控制以较低的整体成本导航AV。然后,我们比较了没有和有中间环节的总旅行成本,并发现布雷斯悖论可能仍然会出现在某些条件下。我们还测试了我们提出的模型和解决方案的算法上OW网络。

英文摘要:

This paper aims to answer the research question as to optimal design of decision-making processes for autonomous vehicles (AVs), including dynamical selection of driving velocity and route choices on a transportation network. Dynamic traffic assignment (DTA) has been widely used to model travelers's route choice or/and departure-time choice and predict dynamic traffic flow evolution in the short term. However, the existing DTA models do not explicitly describe one's selection of driving velocity on a road link. Driving velocity choice may not be crucial for modeling the movement of human drivers but it is a must-have control to maneuver AVs. In this paper, we aim to develop a game-theoretic model to solve for AVs's optimal driving strategies of velocity control in the interior of a road link and route choice at a junction node. To this end, we will first reinterpret the DTA problem as an N-car differential game and show that this game can be tackled with a general mean field game-theoretic framework. The developed mean field game is challenging to solve because of the forward and backward structure for velocity control and the complementarity conditions for route choice. An efficient algorithm is developed to address these challenges. The model and the algorithm are illustrated on the Braess network and the OW network with a single destination. On the Braess network, we first compare the LWR based DTA model with the proposed game and find that the driving and routing control navigates AVs with overall lower costs. We then compare the total travel cost without and with the middle link and find that the Braess paradox may still arise under certain conditions. We also test our proposed model and solution algorithm on the OW network.

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