最优货币政策的不完全可信与不可信
Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy
摘要：
最低限度的中央银行信誉，以及不违背其承诺（“准承诺”）的非零概率，是锚定通胀预期和稳定通胀动态的必要条件。相比之下，完全缺乏可信度，政策制定者肯定会违背自己的承诺（“最佳自由裁量权”），导致通货膨胀动态的局部不稳定。在新凯恩斯主义菲利普斯曲线的教科书例子中，准承诺下的最优政策的政策工具对通胀缺口的反应与最优自由裁量下的相反，这解释了这种分歧。
英文摘要：
A minimal central bank credibility, with a non-zero probability of not renegning his commitment ("quasi-commitment"), is a necessary condition for anchoring inflation expectations and stabilizing inflation dynamics. By contrast, a complete lack of credibility, with the certainty that the policy maker will renege his commitment ("optimal discretion"), leads to the local instability of inflation dynamics. In the textbook example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the response of the policy instrument to inflation gaps for optimal policy under quasi-commitment has an opposite sign than in optimal discretion, which explains this bifurcation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
