政策制定者的可信度与前瞻性目标的预定工具
Policy Maker's Credibility with Predetermined Instruments for Forward-Looking Targets
摘要：
本文的目的是为中央银行在关注产出缺口和预期通货膨胀等多个政策目标时如何选择不同的货币政策规则提供标准。特别注意的问题是，政策工具是预先确定的，还是只是前瞻性的。使用新凯恩斯菲利普斯曲线和成本推动-冲击政策-传导机制，前瞻性案例意味着稳定政策极端缺乏稳健性和可信度。在后向情形下，简单规则参数可以是有限承诺下Ramsey最优策略的解。因此，我们建议明确建模的理性行为的政策制定者与拉姆齐最优政策，而不是使用简单的规则与模糊的假设，导致政策建议，既不强大，也不可信。
英文摘要：
The aim of the present paper is to provide criteria for a central bank of how to choose among different monetary-policy rules when caring about a number of policy targets such as the output gap and expected inflation. Special attention is given to the question if policy instruments are predetermined or only forward looking. Using the new-Keynesian Phillips curve with a cost-push-shock policy-transmission mechanism, the forward-looking case implies an extreme lack of robustness and of credibility of stabilization policy. The backward-looking case is such that the simple-rule parameters can be the solution of Ramsey optimal policy under limited commitment. As a consequence, we suggest to model explicitly the rational behavior of the policy maker with Ramsey optimal policy, rather than to use simple rules with an ambiguous assumption leading to policy advice that is neither robust nor credible.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
