It is known that the slow motion $X^\varepsilon$ in the time-scaled multidimensional averaging setup $\frac {dX^\varepsilon(t)}{dt}=\frac 1\varepsilon B(X^\varepsilon(t),\,ξ(t/\varepsilon^2))+b(X^\varepsilon(t),\,ξ(t/\ve^2)),\, t\in [0,T]$ converges weakly as $\varepsilon\to 0$ to a diffusion process provided $EB(x,ξ(s))\equiv 0$ where $ξ$ is a sufficiently fast mixing stochastic process. In this paper we show that both $X^\varepsilon$ and a family of diffusions $Ξ^\varepsilon$ can be redefined on a common sufficiently rich probability space so that $E\sup_{0\leq t\leq T}|X^\varepsilon(t)-Ξ^\varepsilon(t)|^{2M}\leq C(M)\varepsilon^\del$ for some $C(M),δ>0$ and all $M\ge 1,\,\varepsilon>0$, where all $Ξ^\varepsilon,\, \varepsilon>0$ have the same diffusion coefficients but underlying Brownian motions may change with $\varepsilon$. This is the first strong approximation result both in the above setup and at all when the limit is a nontrivial multidimensional diffusion. We obtain also a similar result for the corresponding discrete time averaging setup which was not considered before at all. As an application we consider Dynkin's games with path dependent payoffs involving a diffusion and obtain error estimates for computation of values of such games by means of such discrete time approximations which provides a more effective computational tool than the standard discretization of the diffusion itself.
We introduce an efficient numerical scheme for continuous time Dynkin games under model uncertainty. We use the Skorokhod embedding in order to construct recombining tree approximations. This technique allows us to determine convergence rates and to construct numerically optimal stopping strategies. We apply our method to several examples of game options.
We introduce a new class of reflected backward stochastic differential equations with two càdlàg barriers, which need not satisfy any separation conditions. For that reason, in general, the solutions are not semimartingales. We prove existence, uniqueness and approximation results for solutions of equations defined on general filtered probability spaces. Applications to Dynkin games and variational inequalities, both stationary and evolutionary, are given.
We study reflected backward stochastic differential equation (RBSDEs) on the probability space equipped with a Brownian motion. The main novelty of the paper lies in fact that we consider the following weak assumptions on the data: barriers are optional of class (D) satisfying weak Mokobodzki's condition, generator is continuous and non-increasing with respect to the value-variable (no restriction on the growth) and Lipschitz continuous with respect to the control-variable, and the terminal condition and the generator at zero are supposed to be merely integrable. We prove that under these cond…
Doubly reflected BSDEs driven by Inhomogeneous simple Levy processes: Applications to generalized Dynkin games
Cadi Ayyad University (UCA), National School of Applied Sciences of Marrakech (ENSA-M)（卡迪阿亚德大学，马拉喀什应用科学学院）；Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Sciences of Gabès, University of Gabès（加贝斯大学，加贝斯理学院数学系）
We introduce a generalized Dynkin game problem with non linear conditional expectation ${\cal E}$ induced by a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE) with jumps. Let $ξ, ζ$ be two RCLL adapted processes with $ξ\leq ζ$. The criterium is given by \begin{equation*} {\cal J}_{τ, σ}= {\cal E}_{0, τ\wedge σ} \left(ξ_τ\textbf{1}_{\{ τ\leq σ\}}+ζ_σ\textbf{1}_{\{σ<τ\}}\right) \end{equation*} where $τ$ and $ σ$ are stopping times valued in $[0,T]$. Under Mokobodski's condition, we establish the existence of a value function for this game, i.e. $\inf_σ\sup_τ {\cal J}_{τ, σ} = \sup_τ \inf_σ {\ca…
The paper solves constrained Dynkin games with risk-sensitive criteria, where two players are allowed to stop at two independent Poisson random intervention times, via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. This generalizes the previous work of [Liang and Sun, Dynkin games with Poisson random intervention times, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2019] from the risk-neutral criteria and common signal times for both players to the risk-sensitive criteria and two heterogenous signal times. Furthermore, the paper establishes a connection of such constrained risk-sensitiv…
We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish sufficient conditions under which such a game admits a value and a saddle point. Furthermore, we provide a characterization of the value of the game in terms of a specific class of doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) of mean-field type, for which we derive an existence and uniqueness result. We then introduce a corresponding system o…
A Dynkin game is a zero-sum, stochastic stopping game between two players where either player can stop the game at any time for an observable payoff. Typically the payoff process of the max-player is assumed to be smaller than the payoff process of the min-player, while the payoff process for simultaneous stopping is in between the two. In this paper, we study general Dynkin games whose payoff processes are in arbitrary positions. In both discrete and continuous time settings, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and epsilon-optimal …
Two sided long-time optimization singular control problems for Lévy processes and Dynkin's games
Centro de Matemática. Facultad de Ciencias, Universidad de la República（乌拉圭共和国大学理学院数学中心）；Ingeniería Forestal. Centro Universitario de Tacuarembó, Universidad de la República（乌拉圭共和国大学塔夸伦博大学中心林业工程系）；Department of Mathematics, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel（基尔大学数学系）
We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a constructive algorithm. One of the main features is that the payoffs of the players depend on the set of players that stop at the termination stage which is the minimal stage in which at least one player stops. The existence result is extended to the case of a nonzero-sum game with finite horizon. Finally, the algorithm is illustrated by two explicit examples i…
We study a doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) with integrable parameters and the related Dynkin game. When the lower obstacle $L$ and the upper obstacle $U$ of the equation are completely separated, we construct a unique solution of the doubly reflected BSDE by pasting local solutions and show that the $Y-$component of the unique solution represents the value process of the corresponding Dynkin game under $g-$evaluation, a nonlinear expectation induced by BSDEs with the same generator $g$ as the doubly reflected BSDE concerned. In particular, the first time when …
This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's value to be continuous with respect to the time horizon are obtained using recent results on norm estimates for doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations. This theory is then demonstrated numerically for the special cases of cancellable call and put options in a Black-Scholes market.
We study a class of optimal stopping games (Dynkin games) of preemption type, with uncertainty about the existence of competitors. The set-up is well-suited to model, for example, real options in the context of investors who do not want to publicly reveal their interest in a certain business opportunity. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in randomized stopping times which is described explicitly in terms of the corresponding one-player game.
This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a bi-dimensional diffusion $(X,Y)$. Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which each player stops at the hitting time of $(X,Y)$ to a set with moving boundary. A detailed description of the stopping sets for the two players is provided along with global $C^1$ regularity of the value function.
We formulate a notion of doubly reflected BSDE in the case where the barriers $ξ$ and $ζ$ do not satisfy any regularity assumption and with a general filtration. Under a technical assumption (a Mokobodzki-type condition), we show existence and uniqueness of the solution. In the case where $ξ$ is right upper-semicontinuous and $ζ$ is right lower-semicontinuous, the solution is characterized in terms of the value of a corresponding $\mathcal{E}^f$-Dynkin game, i.e. a game problem over stopping times with (non-linear) $f$-expectation, where $f$ is the driver of the doubly reflected BSDE. In the g…
We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric information admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general \cadlag measurable processes. As a by-product of our method of proof we also obtain existence of optimal strategies for both players. The main novelties are that we do not assume a Markovian nature of the game nor a particular structure of the information available to the players. This allows us to go beyond the variational methods (based on PDEs) developed in the literature on Dynkin games in continuous t…
In the nonzero-sum setting, we establish a connection between Nash equilibria in games of optimal stopping (Dynkin games) and generalised Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP). In the Dynkin game this reveals novel equilibria of threshold type and of more complex types, and leads to novel uniqueness and stability results.
We study a robust Dynkin game over a set of mutually singular probabilities. We first prove that for the conservative player of the game, her lower and upper value processes coincide (i.e. She has a value process $V $ in the game). Such a result helps people connect the robust Dynkin game with second-order doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations. Also, we show that the value process $V$ is a submartingale under an appropriately defined nonlinear expectations up to the first time $τ_*$ when $V$ meets the lower payoff process $L$. If the probability set is weakly compact, one…
We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) $g$-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum game on discrete stopping times with two agents who aim at minimizing their respective risks. The payoffs of the agents are assessed by g-expectations (with possibly different drivers for the different players). By using the results of the first part, combined with some ideas of S. Hamad{è}ne and J. Zhang, we construct a Nash equilibrium point of this game by a…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player (incomplete information feature), but known to the other one (asymmetric information feature). We formulate the problem and reduce it to a fully Markovian setup where the uninformed player optimises over stopping times and the informed one uses randomised stopping times in order to hide their informational advantage. Then we provide a general verification result wh…
Conditional Reflected Backward Stochastic Differential Equations with Two Barriers
Research Center for Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Sciences, Shandong University（山东大学数学交叉科学研究院）；Frontiers Science Center for Nonlinear Expectations (Ministry of Education), Shandong University（山东大学非线性预期前沿科学中心（教育部））
We consider a zero-sum continuous time stopping game in which the pay-off is revealed in the maximum of the two stopping times instead of the minimum, which is the case in Dynkin games.
We obtain error estimates for strong approximations of a diffusion with a diffusion matrix $σ$ and a drift b by the discrete time process defined recursively X_N((n+1)/N) = X_N(n/N)+N^{1/2}σ(X_N(n/N))ξ(n+1)+N^{-1}b(XN(n/N)); where ξ(n); n\geq 1 are i.i.d. random vectors, and apply this in order to approximate the fair price of a game option with a diffusion asset price evolution by values of Dynkin's games with payoffs based on the above discrete time processes. This provides an effective tool for computations of fair prices of game options with path dependent payoffs in a multi asset market w…
