利用工艺变化保护光子NoC架构免受窥探攻击
Exploiting Process Variations to Secure Photonic NoC Architectures from Snooping Attacks
摘要：
微型谐振器（MR）的紧凑尺寸和高波长选择性使得光子片上网络（PNoCs）能够在其光子波导中利用密集波分复用（DWDM），从而实现高带宽的片上数据传输。不幸的是，PNoC中的硬件木马可以操纵其MR的电驱动电路，以使MR从共享光子波导中的相邻波长信道窥探数据，这引入了严重的安全威胁。本文提出了一个框架，利用过程变量为基础的认证签名以及架构级的增强功能，以防止数据窥探硬件木马在单播以及多播传输PNoCs。评估结果表明，我们的框架可以提高各种PNoC架构的硬件安全性，平均延迟高达14.2%，能量延迟产品（EDP）高达14.6%。
英文摘要：
The compact size and high wavelength-selectivity of microring resonators (MRs) enable photonic networks-on-chip (PNoCs) to utilize dense-wavelength-division-multiplexing (DWDM) in their photonic waveguides, and as a result, attain high bandwidth on-chip data transfers. Unfortunately, a Hardware Trojan in a PNoC can manipulate the electrical driving circuit of its MRs to cause the MRs to snoop data from the neighboring wavelength channels in a shared photonic waveguide, which introduces a serious security threat. This paper presents a framework that utilizes process variation-based authentication signatures along with architecture-level enhancements to protect against data-snooping Hardware Trojans during unicast as well as multicast transfers in PNoCs. Evaluation results indicate that our framework can improve hardware security across various PNoC architectures with minimal overheads of up to 14.2% in average latency and of up to 14.6% in energy-delay-product (EDP).
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