arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2006.16387cs.GT
收藏

超大型对策中的小纳什均衡证明

Small Nash Equilibrium Certificates in Very Large Games

Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm

摘要:

在许多游戏设置中,游戏没有明确给出,而只能通过玩它来访问。虽然在这样的设置中有令人印象深刻的演示,但现有技术没有提供安全保证,即保证计算策略的博弈论可利用性。在本文中,我们介绍了一种方法,表明它是可能的,在这样的设置提供可利用性保证,而无需探索整个游戏。我们引入了一个概念的证书的一个扩展形式的近似纳什均衡。为了验证证书,我们给出了一个算法,该算法在时间上与证书的大小成线性关系,而不是与整个博弈的大小成线性关系。在零和游戏中,我们进一步证明了最优证书-考虑到目前为止的探索-可以用任何标准的游戏求解算法(例如,使用线性程序或反事实后悔最小化)。然而,与范式或完美信息的情况下,我们表明,某些家庭的广泛形式的游戏没有小的近似证书,即使在作出非常好的假设的游戏结构。尽管有这种困难,我们发现实验非常小的证书,甚至确切的,往往存在于大型,甚至在无限的游戏。总的来说,我们的方法使人们能够尝试自己最喜欢的探索策略,同时提供可利用性保证,从而将探索策略与均衡发现过程脱钩。

英文摘要:

In many game settings, the game is not explicitly given but is only accessible by playing it. While there have been impressive demonstrations in such settings, prior techniques have not offered safety guarantees, that is, guarantees on the game-theoretic exploitability of the computed strategies. In this paper we introduce an approach that shows that it is possible to provide exploitability guarantees in such settings without ever exploring the entire game. We introduce a notion of a certificate of an extensive-form approximate Nash equilibrium. For verifying a certificate, we give an algorithm that runs in time linear in the size of the certificate rather than the size of the whole game. In zero-sum games, we further show that an optimal certificate -- given the exploration so far -- can be computed with any standard game-solving algorithm (e.g., using a linear program or counterfactual regret minimization). However, unlike in the cases of normal form or perfect information, we show that certain families of extensive-form games do not have small approximate certificates, even after making extremely nice assumptions on the structure of the game. Despite this difficulty, we find experimentally that very small certificates, even exact ones, often exist in large and even in infinite games. Overall, our approach enables one to try one's favorite exploration strategies while offering exploitability guarantees, thereby decoupling the exploration strategy from the equilibrium-finding process.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑