受限分配机制中的激励与效率
Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
AI总结：
研究一般约束下的私人物品分配，证明两人防策略机制为局部独裁，N人群体防策略机制包含局部独裁边际机制，为房屋分配、室友匹配等问题提供统一见解，并应用于任务分配与网络规制。
摘要：
我们研究一般约束下的私人物品分配问题。若干著名例子是其特例，包括房屋分配、室友匹配、社会选择和多重分配。每个个体防策略且帕累托有效的两人机制都是“局部独裁”。每个群体防策略的N人机制都有作为局部独裁的两人边际机制。这些结果为已知刻画提供了新刻画和统一见解。我们找出了室友问题的所有群体防策略且帕累托有效的机制。我们给出了多重分配的相关结果。我们证明了Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理并给出了部分逆命题。我们还将刻画应用于任务分配和网络规制问题。
英文摘要：
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto efficient two-agent mechanism is a "local dictatorship." Every group strategy-proof N-agent mechanism has two-agent marginal mechanisms that are local dictatorships. These results yield new characterizations and unifying insights for known characterizations. We find all group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms for the roommates problem. We give a related result for multiple assignment. We prove the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and give a partial converse. We also apply our characterization to task allocation and network regulation problems.
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