基于自旋的内存计算中的硬件安全：分析、利用和缓解技术
Hardware Security in Spin-Based Computing-In-Memory: Analysis, Exploits, and Mitigation Techniques
摘要：
内存计算（Computing-in-memory，CIM）是为了缓解传统Von-Neumann体系结构中处理器-内存数据传输的瓶颈而提出的，而基于自旋电子学的磁存储器在实现CIM范式方面表现出了许多便利性。由于硬件安全已成为电路设计中的主要关注点之一，本文首次从安全的角度研究了基于自旋的内存计算（SpinCIM）。我们关注两个基本问题：1）如何利用新的SpinCIM计算范式来增强硬件安全性？2)这种新的SpinCIM计算模式引发了哪些安全问题？
英文摘要：
Computing-in-memory (CIM) is proposed to alleviate the processor-memory data transfer bottleneck in traditional Von-Neumann architectures, and spintronics-based magnetic memory has demonstrated many facilitation in implementing CIM paradigm. Since hardware security has become one of the major concerns in circuit designs, this paper, for the first time, investigates spin-based computing-in-memory (SpinCIM) from a security perspective. We focus on two fundamental questions: 1) how the new SpinCIM computing paradigm can be exploited to enhance hardware security? 2) what security concerns has this new SpinCIM computing paradigm incurred?
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
