首选加权赞成投票制的性质评价
Evaluating the Properties of a First Choice Weighted Approval Voting System
摘要:
多数票制和赞成票制是两种著名的投票制度,它们各有优缺点。在本文中,我们考虑一个新的投票系统,我们称之为beta(k),它允许选民选择一个第一选择的候选人,并批准任何其他数量的候选人,其中k表示相对权重给予第一选择,这个系统本质上是一个混合的多元化和批准。我们的主要目标是描述beta(k)对于任意k值的行为。在某些合理的假设下,beta(k)可以模拟单一获胜者的情况下的多数或批准投票,而否则可能会打破平局。在选民是诚实的假设下,我们表明,它是可能的,以找到一个给定的候选人将赢得选举,如果各自的批准和多数票是已知的k值。最后,我们展示了beta(k)如何满足一些常用的投票系统标准。
英文摘要:
Plurality and approval voting are two well-known voting systems with different strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we consider a new voting system we call beta(k) which allows voters to select a single first-choice candidate and approve of any other number of candidates, where k denotes the relative weight given to a first choice; this system is essentially a hybrid of plurality and approval. Our primary goal is to characterize the behavior of beta(k) for any value of k. Under certain reasonable assumptions, beta(k) can be made to mimic plurality or approval voting in the event of a single winner while potentially breaking ties otherwise. Under the assumption that voters are honest, we show that it is possible to find the values of k for which a given candidate will win the election if the respective approval and plurality votes are known. Finally, we show how some of the commonly used voting system criteria are satisfied by beta(k).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。