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arXiv 2005.06636econ.THcs.GTcs.LO
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无限持续时间全付费竞标游戏

Infinite-Duration All-Pay Bidding Games

Guy Avni, Ismaël Jecker, Đorđe Žikelić

摘要:

在两人零和图游戏中,玩家在图中移动令牌以产生无限路径,这决定了游戏的赢家或收益。传统上,玩家轮流移动代币。然而,在{ \em出价游戏}中,玩家有预算,在每一轮中,我们举行“拍卖”(出价)来确定哪个玩家移动代币:两个玩家同时提交出价,出价更高的人移动代币。投标机制的付款办法各不相同。竞价博弈主要是用{ \em first-price}竞价的变体来研究的,在这种变体中,只有出价更高的人支付他的出价。我们专注于{ \em all-pay}出价,其中两个玩家都支付他们的出价。研究表明,在技术上,持续时间较长的全付费竞价游戏比一价竞价游戏更具挑战性。我们首次研究了无限持续时间的全付费投标博弈。我们最有趣的结果是{ \em平均收益}目标:我们描绘了一个完整的图片上玩的游戏强连接图。我们研究了纯(确定性)和混合(概率)策略,并完全描述了最佳的肯定和几乎肯定(概率$1$)的支付,球员可以分别保证。我们发现,在全支付出价下的平均支付博弈表现出了与第一价格博弈类似的有趣的数学性质;即,与{ \em random-turn games}等价,其中在每一轮中,移动的玩家根据(有偏见的)掷硬币来选择。全付投标的等价性比一价投标更复杂,也更出人意料。

英文摘要:

In a two-player zero-sum graph game the players move a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in moving the token. In {\em bidding games}, however, the players have budgets, and in each turn, we hold an "auction" (bidding) to determine which player moves the token: both players simultaneously submit bids and the higher bidder moves the token. The bidding mechanisms differ in their payment schemes. Bidding games were largely studied with variants of {\em first-price} bidding in which only the higher bidder pays his bid. We focus on {\em all-pay} bidding, where both players pay their bids. Finite-duration all-pay bidding games were studied and shown to be technically more challenging than their first-price counterparts. We study for the first time, infinite-duration all-pay bidding games. Our most interesting results are for {\em mean-payoff} objectives: we portray a complete picture for games played on strongly-connected graphs. We study both pure (deterministic) and mixed (probabilistic) strategies and completely characterize the optimal sure and almost-sure (with probability $1$) payoffs that the players can respectively guarantee. We show that mean-payoff games under all-pay bidding exhibit the intriguing mathematical properties of their first-price counterparts; namely, an equivalence with {\em random-turn games} in which in each turn, the player who moves is selected according to a (biased) coin toss. The equivalences for all-pay bidding are more intricate and unexpected than for first-price bidding.

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