机制设计和区块链
Mechanism Design and Blockchains
摘要：
博弈论通常被用作分析去中心化系统及其属性的工具，特别是区块链。在本说明中，我们持相反的观点。我们认为，区块链可以而且应该被用来实现经济机制，因为它们可以帮助克服如果不能假设对机制设计者的信任而出现的问题。机制设计处理资源分配给代理，往往是通过提取私人信息。有些机制不受早期信息披露的影响，有些机制则严重依赖早期信息披露，有些机制则必须随机化以实现公平和效率。信息披露和随机性这两个问题都需要对机制设计者的信任。如果没有信任，机制就可能被操纵。我们声称，使用随机性或顺序信息披露的机制即使不是不可能，也更难审计。因此，集中实施往往不是一个好的解决方案。我们认为，在实践中最常用的一些机制，并确定在何种情况下操纵是可能的。我们提出了这种机制的去中心化实现，实际上可以通过区块链技术实现。此外，我们认为在哪些环境中，一个机制的分散实施带来了显着的优势。
英文摘要：
Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decentralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains. In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockchains can and should be used to implement economic mechanisms because they can help to overcome problems that occur if trust in the mechanism designer cannot be assumed. Mechanism design deals with the allocation of resources to agents, often by extracting private information from them. Some mechanisms are immune to early information disclosure, while others may heavily depend on it. Some mechanisms have to randomize to achieve fairness and efficiency. Both issues, information disclosure, and randomness require trust in the mechanism designer. If there is no trust, mechanisms can be manipulated. We claim that mechanisms that use randomness or sequential information disclosure are much harder, if not impossible, to audit. Therefore, centralized implementation is often not a good solution. We consider some of the most frequently used mechanisms in practice and identify circumstances under which manipulation is possible. We propose a decentralized implementation of such mechanisms, that can be, in practical terms, realized by blockchain technology. Moreover, we argue in which environments a decentralized implementation of a mechanism brings a significant advantage.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
