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arXiv 2004.11738quant-phcs.CR
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抗合谋攻击的安全多方量子密钥协商

Secure multiparty quantum key agreement against collusive attacks

Hussein Abulkasim, Atefeh Mashatan, Shohini Ghose

AI总结:

针对环形多方量子密钥协商中的合谋攻击,提出通用安全模型以消除漏洞,不依赖具体物理实现。

摘要:

量子密钥协商使得远程参与者能够基于各自的私有输入公平地建立一个安全共享密钥。在环形多方量子密钥协商模式中,两个或多个恶意参与者可以合谋窃取诚实参与者的私有输入,或单独生成最终密钥。在本工作中,我们关注一种强大的合谋攻击策略,其中两个或多个位于特定位置的恶意参与者能够在不暴露其恶意行为的情况下获取敏感信息或单独生成最终密钥。当前许多环形多方量子密钥协商协议对此类合谋攻击策略并不安全。作为示例,我们分析了一个近期提出的多方密钥协商协议的安全性,以展示现有环形多方量子密钥协商协议对此类合谋攻击的脆弱性。此外,我们设计了一个通用的安全多方密钥协商模型,该模型能够消除此类环形密钥协商协议中的这一漏洞,并描述了实施该模型的必要步骤。所提出的模型具有通用性,不依赖于量子密钥协商的具体物理实现。

英文摘要:

Quantum key agreement enables remote participants to fairly establish a secure shared key based on their private inputs. In the circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement mode, two or more malicious participants can collude together to steal private inputs of honest participants or to generate the final key alone. In this work, we focus on a powerful collusive attack strategy in which two or more malicious participants in particular positions, can learn sensitive information or generate the final key alone without revealing their malicious behaviour. Many of the current circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement protocols are not secure against this collusive attack strategy. As an example, we analyze the security of a recently proposed multiparty key agreement protocol to show the vulnerability of existing circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement protocols against this collusive attack. Moreover, we design a general secure multiparty key agreement model that would remove this vulnerability from such circular-type key agreement protocols and describe the necessary steps to implement this model. The proposed model is general and does not depend on the specific physical implementation of the quantum key agreement.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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