arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2004.00509cs.CRcs.ITmath.IT
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基于码的单服务器计算PIR方案的保密性

On the privacy of a code-based single-server computational PIR scheme

Sarah Bordage, Julien Lavauzelle

摘要:

我们证明了Holzbaur,Hollanti和Wachter-Zeh在2020年提出的单服务器计算PIR协议不是私有的,在这个意义上,服务器可以在多项式时间内以非常高的概率恢复所需文件的索引。攻击基于以下观察。删除查询矩阵中与所需文件相对应的行会大大降低该穿孔矩阵的行所跨越的向量空间的$\mathbb{F}_q$上的维数。只有在删除与请求的文件无关的行时,才会出现这种维度丢失,其概率可以忽略不计。

英文摘要:

We show that the single-server computational PIR protocol proposed by Holzbaur, Hollanti and Wachter-Zeh in 2020 is not private, in the sense that the server can recover in polynomial time the index of the desired file with very high probability. The attack relies on the following observation. Removing rows of the query matrix corresponding to the desired file yields a large decrease of the dimension over $\mathbb{F}_q$ of the vector space spanned by the rows of this punctured matrix. Such a dimension loss only shows up with negligible probability when rows unrelated to the requested file are deleted.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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