论信息论单服务器PIR中的量子优势
On Quantum Advantage in Information Theoretic Single-Server PIR
摘要:
在(单服务器)私有信息检索(PIR)中,服务器持有大小为$n$的大型数据库$DB$,并且客户端持有索引$i \in [n]$并且希望检索$DB[i]$而不向服务器揭示$i$。众所周知,即使是对一个“诚实但好奇”的服务器的信息理论隐私需要$Ω(n)$通信复杂性。即使量子通信被允许,这也是真实的,这是由于这种对抗服务器能够在数据库的叠加上而不是在特定数据库上执行协议(“输入净化攻击”)。尽管如此,已经有一些协议的建议,实现次线性通信,似乎提供了一些隐私的概念。最值得注意的是,由于Le Gall(ToC 2012)的协议具有通信复杂度$O(\sqrt{n})$,以及Kereneirs等人(QIC 2016)的协议具有通信复杂度$O(\log(n))$和$O(n)$共享纠缠。我们表明,在某种意义上,输入净化是唯一有效的对抗策略,并且诸如上述两个协议的协议在量子诚实但好奇(也称为似是而非)模型的受限变体中是安全的。更明确地说,我们提出了一个受限制的隐私概念称为\emph{anchored privacy},对手被迫执行一个经典的数据库(即执行锚定到一个经典的数据库)。我们表明,对于无测量协议,锚定的安全性对诚实的敌对服务器意味着锚定的隐私,即使对似是而非的对手。最后,我们证明了即使有(无限的)预共享纠缠,它是不可能实现安全的标准似是而非的模型与次线性通信,从而进一步证实了我们放松的必要性。该下限可以是独立感兴趣的(特别是回顾PIR是全同态加密的特殊情况)。
英文摘要:
In (single-server) Private Information Retrieval (PIR), a server holds a large database $DB$ of size $n$, and a client holds an index $i \in [n]$ and wishes to retrieve $DB[i]$ without revealing $i$ to the server. It is well known that information theoretic privacy even against an `honest but curious' server requires $Ω(n)$ communication complexity. This is true even if quantum communication is allowed and is due to the ability of such an adversarial server to execute the protocol on a superposition of databases instead of on a specific database (`input purification attack'). Nevertheless, there have been some proposals of protocols that achieve sub-linear communication and appear to provide some notion of privacy. Most notably, a protocol due to Le Gall (ToC 2012) with communication complexity $O(\sqrt{n})$, and a protocol by Kerenidis et al. (QIC 2016) with communication complexity $O(\log(n))$, and $O(n)$ shared entanglement. We show that, in a sense, input purification is the only potent adversarial strategy, and protocols such as the two protocols above are secure in a restricted variant of the quantum honest but curious (a.k.a specious) model. More explicitly, we propose a restricted privacy notion called \emph{anchored privacy}, where the adversary is forced to execute on a classical database (i.e. the execution is anchored to a classical database). We show that for measurement-free protocols, anchored security against honest adversarial servers implies anchored privacy even against specious adversaries. Finally, we prove that even with (unlimited) pre-shared entanglement it is impossible to achieve security in the standard specious model with sub-linear communication, thus further substantiating the necessity of our relaxation. This lower bound may be of independent interest (in particular recalling that PIR is a special case of Fully Homomorphic Encryption).
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