不对称党派选民投票率游戏
Asymmetric Partisan Voter Turnout Games
摘要：
自从唐斯在1957年提出投票行为是非理性的以来，无数的模型被提出来解释投票和解释观察到的投票率模式。我们提出了一个模型，在该模型中，党派考虑他们的投票时，决定是否在选举中弃权的工具和表达的好处，引入了大多数其他模型不考虑的不对称。允许我们的选民的学习过程中，我们分析什么样的投票率状态是合理的在各种条件下。我们的模型预测的比较静态是一致的选民的行为。此外，放松我们的一些初步假设消除了我们的模型和经验选民行为之间的一些差异。
英文摘要：
Since Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and expressive benefits of their vote when deciding whether or not to abstain in an election, introducing an asymmetry that most other models do not consider. Allowing learning processes within our electorate, we analyze what turnout states are rationalizable under various conditions. Our model predicts comparative statics that are consistent with voter behavior. Furthermore, relaxing some of our preliminary assumptions eliminates some of the discrepancies between our model and empirical voter behavior.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
