少数人如何获胜：简单投票率模型中的不民主结果
How a minority can win: Undemocratic outcomes in a simple model of voter turnout
摘要：
选举的结果不仅取决于哪个候选人更受欢迎，还取决于有多少选民实际投票。在这里，我们考虑一个简单的模型，其中选民弃权投票，如果他们认为他们的投票无关紧要。具体地说，如果他们确信他们喜欢的候选人无论如何都会获胜（我们称之为自满），或者如果他们确信他们的候选人无论如何都会失败（我们称之为沮丧），他们就不会投票。选民基于对他们当地网络的短视评估做出这些决定，他们将其视为整个选民的代理人：选民知道他们的邻居更喜欢哪个候选人，他们假设-也许是错误的-这些邻居会投票，所以他们自己投票，当且仅当它会在当地社区产生平局或他们首选的候选人获胜时。我们探讨了各种网络结构和选民偏好的分布，并发现某些结构和参数制度有利于不民主的结果，其中一个少数派别获胜，特别是当当地首选的候选人是不代表选民作为一个整体。
英文摘要：
The outcome of an election depends not only on which candidate is more popular, but also on how many of their voters actually turn out to vote. Here we consider a simple model in which voters abstain from voting if they think their vote would not matter. Specifically, they do not vote if they feel sure their preferred candidate will win anyway (a condition we call complacency), or if they feel sure their candidate will lose anyway (a condition we call dejectedness). The voters reach these decisions based on a myopic assessment of their local network, which they take as a proxy for the entire electorate: voters know which candidate their neighbors prefer and they assume -- perhaps incorrectly -- that those neighbors will turn out to vote, so they themselves cast a vote if and only if it would produce a tie or a win for their preferred candidate in their local neighborhood. We explore various network structures and distributions of voter preferences and find that certain structures and parameter regimes favor undemocratic outcomes where a minority faction wins, especially when the locally preferred candidate is not representative of the electorate as a whole.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
