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arXiv 2002.12748physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
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经济流行病学博弈中疾病状态的自发发散

Spontaneous divergence of disease status in an economic epidemiological game

Ewan Colman, Nicholas Hanley, Rowland R. Kao

摘要:

我们介绍了一个游戏的灵感来自于畜牧业疾病管理的挑战和地方病通过贸易网络的传播。在这个游戏中,成功来自于平衡购买新股的成本和它将携带某种疾病的风险。当玩家遵循一个简单的基于记忆的策略时,我们观察到一个自发的分离,分为两组,分别对应于感染水平相对较高或较低的玩家。通过对疾病的动态以及贸易关系的形成和破坏进行建模,我们得出了这种分离发生的条件,作为每个参与者可接受疾病的传播率和阈值水平的函数。当游戏中的互动仅限于在小世界网络中彼此相邻的玩家时,玩家往往与他们的邻居具有相似的感染水平。我们的结论是,成功的经济流行病学系统可以源于不幸和地理环境,以及在个人对风险的态度的先天差异。

英文摘要:

We introduce a game inspired by the challenges of disease management in livestock farming and the transmission of endemic disease through a trade network. Success in this game comes from balancing the cost of buying new stock with the risk that it will be carrying some disease. When players follow a simple memory-based strategy we observe a spontaneous separation into two groups corresponding to players with relatively high, or low, levels of infection. By modelling the dynamics of both the disease and the formation and breaking of trade relationships, we derive the conditions for which this separation occurs as a function of the transmission rate and the threshold level of acceptable disease for each player. When interactions in the game are restricted to players that neighbour each other in a small-world network, players tend to have similar levels of infection as their neighbours. We conclude that success in economic-epidemiological systems can originate from misfortune and geographical circumstances as well as by innate differences in personal attitudes towards risk.

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