财政与货币相互作用下的Ramsey最优政策与多重均衡
Ramsey Optimal Policy versus Multiple Equilibria with Fiscal and Monetary Interactions
摘要：
我们在Leeper（1991）的基础上考虑一个无摩擦的常数禀赋经济。在这种经济中，它表明，在一个特设的货币规则和特设的财政规则，有两个均衡。一种是积极的货币政策和消极的财政政策，另一种是消极的货币政策和积极的财政政策。我们考虑了一个扩展的设置，其中政策制定者在准承诺下最小化损失函数，如Schaumburg和Tambalotti（2007）。在这种提法下，存在一个独特的拉姆齐均衡，与利率挂钩和被动的财政政策。我们感谢John P. Conley，Luis de Araujo和一位工作人员提供的非常有帮助的意见。
英文摘要：
We consider a frictionless constant endowment economy based on Leeper (1991). In this economy, it is shown that, under an ad-hoc monetary rule and an ad-hoc fiscal rule, there are two equilibria. One has active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, while the other has passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy. We consider an extended setup in which the policy maker minimizes a loss function under quasi-commitment, as in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). Under this formulation there exists a unique Ramsey equilibrium, with an interest rate peg and a passive fiscal policy. We thank John P. Conley, Luis de Araujo and one referree for their very helpful comments.
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