货币-财政互动与政府债务的流动性
Monetary-Fiscal Interaction and the Liquidity of Government Debt
AI总结:
本文构建异质性代理人新凯恩斯主义模型,揭示货币与财政政策互动通过“自我保险需求渠道”与“政策驱动供给渠道”这两种竞争力量影响流动性溢价,进而塑造经济稳定,指出货币政策制定需考虑自我保险对流动性溢价的影响。
摘要:
货币与财政政策组合如何改变家庭的储蓄激励?为回答这些问题,我们构建了一个异质性代理人新凯恩斯主义模型,其中三种不同类型的代理人可以通过投资具有不同流动性特征的资产来防范异质性风险。政策组合根据其对流动性溢价(即流动性较差的资产与公共债务之间的回报差异)的影响,以不同方式影响储蓄激励。我们推导出了一个直观的解析表达式,将流动性溢价与不同类型代理人之间的消费差异联系起来。这凸显了一种传导机制的存在,即货币和财政政策的互动通过其对私人代理人投资组合选择的影响来塑造经济稳定性。我们将其称为“自我保险需求渠道”,该渠道使流动性溢价朝与标准的“政策驱动供给渠道”相反的方向移动。因此,我们的分析揭示了存在两种驱动流动性溢价的竞争力量。我们表明,两者的相对强度与现行的政策组合以及冲击经济的商业周期类型密切相关。这意味着,为了稳定经济,货币政策应考虑“自我保险”对流动性溢价的影响。
英文摘要:
How does the monetary and fiscal policy mix alter households' saving incentives? To answer these questions, we build a heterogenous agents New Keynesian model where three different types of agents can save in assets with different liquidity profiles to insure against idiosyncratic risk. Policy mixes affect saving incentives differently according to their effect on the liquidity premium -- the return difference between less liquid assets and public debt. We derive an intuitive analytical expression linking the liquidity premium with consumption differentials amongst different types of agents. This underscores the presence of a transmission mechanism through which the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy shapes economic stability via its effect on the portfolio choice of private agents. We call it the 'self-insurance demand channel', which moves the liquidity premium in the opposite direction to the standard 'policy-driven supply channel'. Our analysis thus reveals the presence of two competing forces driving the liquidity premium. We show that the relative strength of the two is tightly linked to the policy mix in place and the type of business cycle shock hitting the economy. This implies that to stabilize the economy, monetary policy should consider the impact of the 'self-insurance' on the liquidity premium.
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