发表机构
London School of Economics; Weizmann Institute of Science（伦敦政治经济学院; 魏茨曼科学研究所）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
针对现有CBDC设计的存款外逃与信贷隔离缺陷，提出基于主权与非主权草根币及债券的三组件架构，使央行可直接放贷、调节流动性并选择任意交易对手，且证明法定货币单位价为唯一无套利价格。
AI 中文摘要
央行数字货币（CBDC）是以数字形式存在的央行货币，由公众持有。主流设计方案存在两个局限：从银行存款转换为CBDC可能加速存款外逃，需要设置保障措施；CBDC游离于信用创造和货币政策操作之外。\n\n本文提出一种基于草根货币的CBDC架构，以克服上述局限。该架构包含三个组成部分：（1）货币：主权草根币，即由中央银行发行的一单位法定货币的数字债务，构成直接的CBDC；（2）信贷与流动性：非主权草根币，即同一法定货币一单位、可按面值赎回的数字债务，可由任何自然人或法人发行——从而增加信用；（3）利息：草根债券，包括主权与非主权两种——从而引入期限结构，并随之带来利息、标准银行工具以及中央银行的货币政策工具。\n\n因此，中央银行可以在公众持有的币和债券中进行放贷、吸收流动性、设定利率以及买卖证券，自主选择其信贷操作的交易对手和条款，且无需按需将银行存款转换为新发行的央行货币。\n\n我们证明，对于发行人满足兑付要求的草根币，一单位法定货币是其唯一的无套利价格；并论证中央银行的贷款利率及其自身债券的利率，限定了其交易对手在可比条款下的支付与接受范围；中央银行可以选择与任何交易对手交易，而不仅限于银行。
英文摘要
A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is central-bank money in digital form, held by the public. Leading designs have two limitations: conversion from bank deposits into CBDC can accelerate deposit flight, requiring safeguards, and the CBDC stays outside credit creation and monetary-policy operations. Here we present a CBDC architecture based on grassroots currencies that overcomes these limitations. The architecture has three components: (1) Money: sovereign grassroots coins, which are digital debts of one unit of fiat currency issued by the central bank, constituting a direct CBDC; (2) Credit and Liquidity: non-sovereign grassroots coins, which are digital debts of one unit of the same fiat currency, redeemable at par, that can be issued by any person, natural or legal, thus adding credit; and (3) Interest: grassroots bonds, sovereign and non-sovereign, adding maturity and thus interest, standard banking instruments, and the central bank's instruments of monetary policy. The central bank can therefore lend, absorb liquidity, set its rates and buy and sell securities in the coins and bonds the public holds, choosing the counterparties and terms of its credit operations, and without converting bank deposits into newly issued central bank money on demand. We prove that the arbitrage-free price of any non-sovereign grassroots coin whose issuer redeems it on demand is one unit of the fiat currency. The central bank can choose to deal with any counterparty, not just banks, and we argue that the central bank's interest rates on lending and bonds bound from above and below the corresponding interest rates of its counterparties. Sovereign and non-sovereign grassroots coins and bonds have been implemented and tested on a small scale.
