The Frauchiger-Renner Paradox is an extension of paradoxes based on the 'Problem of Measurement,' such as Schrodinger's Cat and Wigner's Friend. All of these paradoxes stem from assuming that quantum theory has only unitary (linear) physical dynamics, and the attendant ambiguity about what counts as a 'measurement'--i.e., the inability to account for the observation of determinate measurement outcomes from within the theory itself. This paper discusses a basic inconsistency arising in the FR scenario at a much earlier point than the derived contradiction: namely, the inconsistency inherent in treating an improper mixture (reduced density operator) as a proper, epistemic mixture. This is an illegitimate procedure that is nevertheless endemic if quantum theory is assumed to be always unitary. In contrast, under a non-unitary account of quantum state reduction yielding determinate outcomes, the use of a proper mixture for measurement results becomes legitimate, and this entire class of paradoxes cannot be mounted. The conclusion is that the real lesson of the FR paradox is that it is the unitary-only assumption that needs to be critically reassessed.
Bub has recently claimed that the Frauchiger-Renner argument does not require an assumption that the state vector undergoes projection after measurement. It is shown that this claim is not true, and an alternative understanding of the argument is offered.
In 2018, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published an article in Nature Communications entitled `Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself.' I clarify the significance of the result and point out a common and persistent misunderstanding of the argument, which has been attacked as flawed from a variety of interpretational perspectives.
We present an analysis of the Frauchiger-Renner Gedankenexperiment from the point of view of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. Our analysis shows that the paradox obtained by Frauchiger and Renner disappears if one rejects promoting one agent's certainty to another agent's certainty when it cannot be validated by records from the past. A by-product of our analysis is an interaction-free detection scheme for the existence of such records.
This note is a critical examination of the argument of Frauchiger and Renner (Nature Communications 9:3711 (2018)), in which they claim to show that three reasonable assumptions about the use of quantum mechanics jointly lead to a contradiction. It is shown that further assumptions are needed to establish the contradiction, and that each of these assumptions is invalid in some version of quantum mechanics.
This is a short text covering some topics on the Foundations of Quantum Theory and it includes some comments on the recent Nature article by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner. The so-called "paradox" is simply due to a misunderstanding on the appropriate way to apply the quantum mechanical rules. The text is meant to be accessible to non physicists and the math is kept to a minimum (just some Linear Algebra and extremely elementary Probability Theory).
In this article we reconstruct the Frauchiger and Renner argument, taking into account that the assertions of the argument are made at different times. To do this, we use a formalism of quantum histories, namely the Theory of Consistent Histories. We show that the supposedly contradictory conclusion of the argument requires computing probabilities in a family of histories that does not satisfy the consistency condition, i.e., an invalid family of histories for the theory.
A recent no-go theorem (Frauchiger and Renner, 2018) establishes a contradiction from a specific application of quantum theory to a multi-agent setting. The proof of this theorem relies heavily on notions such as 'knows' or `is certain that'. This has stimulated an analysis of the theorem by Nurgalieva and del Rio (2018), in which they claim that it shows the "[i]nadequacy of modal logic in quantum settings" (ibid.). In this paper, we will offer a significantly extended and refined reconstruction of the theorem in multi-agent modal logic. We will then show that a thorough reconstruction of the…
Recently, Frauchiger and Renner proposed a Gedankenexperiment, which was claimed to be able to prove that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Here we show that the conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came from their incorrect description of some quantum states. With the correct description there will be no inconsistent results, no matter which quantum interpretation theory is used. Especially, the Copenhagen interpretation can satisfy all the three assumptions (C), (Q), and (S) of Frauchiger and Renner simultaneously, thus it has no problem consistently des…
Following Frauchiger and Renner's discovery of a conflict between quantum mechanics and certain commonsense reasoning axioms, much work has gone into finding alternative axiomatizations that can avoid the conflict. However, this body of work is largely based on specific interpretations of quantum mechanics, and at times employs specialized formalism that may be inaccessible to mainstream quantum information experts. Taking an interpretation-agnostic approach, we propose a simple operational principle called superpositional solipsism to aid rational agents in making situational inferences. We s…
In a recent result, Frauchiger and Renner argue that if quantum theory accurately describes complex systems like observers who perform measurements, then "we are forced to give up the view that there is one single reality." Following a review of the Frauchiger-Renner argument, I argue that quantum mechanics should be understood probabilistically, as a new sort of non-Boolean probability theory, rather than representationally, as a theory about the elementary constituents of the physical world and how these elements evolve dynamically over time. I show that this way of understanding quantum mec…
After a discussion of the Frauchiger-Renner argument that no 'single- world' interpretation of quantum mechanics can be self-consistent, I propose a 'Bohrian' alternative to many-worlds or QBism as the rational option.
We discuss the argument proposed in Ref.~\cite{Frauchiger-Renner}, and show that it does not particularly illustrate any inconsistency in quantum mechanics, but rather the well known difficulty often described as the \textquotedblleft shifty split\textquotedblright: the exact point at which the von Neumann reduction postulate should be applied is ill defined. This is the origin of the famous Schrödinger's cat or Wigner's friend paradoxes. We investigate the argument of Ref.~\cite{Frauchiger-Renner} and show that it combines statements obtained by different agents assuming very different positi…
Frauchiger and Renner have recently claimed to prove that "Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent". This is contradicted by a construction due to Bell, inspired by Bohmian mechanics, which shows that any quantum system can be modelled in such a way that there is only one "world" at any time, but the predictions of quantum theory are reproduced. This Bell-Bohmian theory is applied to the experiment proposed by Frauchiger and Renner, and their argument is critically examined. It is concluded that it is their version of "standard quantum theory", incorporating st…
Recent extended formulations of the Wigner's friend thought experiment throw the measurement problem of quantum mechanics into sharper relief. Here I respond to an invitation by Renner to provide a consistent and concrete set of rules for quantum mechanics which can avoid the apparent paradox formulated by Frauchiger and Renner [Nat. Comm. 9, 3711 (2018)]. I propose a slight addition to standard textbook quantum mechanics, in the form of two rules, which avoids the paradox. The first specifies when a given quantum dynamics can be interpreted as a measurement. Potentially any dynamics can, but …
A recent paper "Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent" [arXiv:1604.07422] by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner has attracted a considerable interest of a broader physics audience and shortly elicited a number of replies. In spite of the objections that ensued, we find that significant part of the controversial initial claim has not been refuted - on the contrary, arguments presented both in the initial paper and in the replies seem to leave no longer room for the basic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. We revisit the controversy trying to pinpoint the…
Which theories lead to a contradiction between simple reasoning principles and modelling observers' memories as physical systems? Frauchiger and Renner have shown that this is the case for quantum theory, with a thought experiment that leads to a multi-agent paradox. Here we generalize the conditions of the Frauchiger-Renner result so that they can be applied to arbitrary physical theories, and in particular to those expressed as generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs). We then apply them to a particular GPT, box world, and find a deterministic contradiction in the case where agents may shar…
We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion appl…
We show that the quantum description of measurement based on decoherence fixes the bug in quantum theory discussed in [D. Frauchiger and R. Renner, {\em Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself}, Nat. Comm. {\bf 9}, 3711 (2018)]. Assuming that the outcome of a measurement is determined by environment-induced superselection rules, we prove that different agents acting on a particular system always reach the same conclusions about its actual state.
The Wigner's friend paradox concerns one of the most puzzling problems of quantum mechanics: the consistent description of multiple nested observers. Recently, a variation of Wigner's gedankenexperiment, introduced by Frauchiger and Renner, has lead to new debates about the self-consistency of quantum mechanics. At the core of the paradox lies the description of an observer and the object it measures as a closed system obeying the Schrödinger equation. We revisit this assumption to derive a necessary condition on a quantum system to behave as an observer. We then propose a simple single-photon…
In the paper "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself" by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner an atempt is made at proving a "no-go theorem" that states that either quantum theory cannot be universally applied, even to macroscopic systems, or some very intuitive properties concerning recursive reasoning and uniquenes of physical values must be false. In this paper, we give a concise description of the paper's result, and expose a detail in the proof.
Classical Bayes' rule lays the foundation for the classical causal relation between cause (input) and effect (output). This causal relation is believed to be universally true for all physical processes. Here we show, on the contrary, that it is inadequate to establish correct correspondence between cause and effect in quantum mechanics. In fact, there are instances within the framework of quantum mechanics where the use of classical Bayes' rule leads to inconsistencies in quantum measurement inferences, such as Frauchiger-Renner's paradox. Similar inconsistency also appears in the context of H…
This is an analysis of the recently published article `Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself' by D. Frauchiger and R. Renner~\cite{1}. Here I decipher the paradox and analyze it from the point of view of de Broglie-Bohm hidden variable theory (i.e., Bohmian mechanics). I also analyze the problem from the perspective obtained by the Copenhagen interpretation (i.e., the Bohrian interpretation) and show that both views are self consistent and do not lead to any contradiction with a `single-world' description of quantum theory.
In April 2016, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published an article online in which they introduce a Gedankenexperiment that led them to conclude that single-world interpretation of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent. In a new version of the paper, published in September 2018, the authors moderate their original claim by concluding that quantum theory cannot be extrapolated to complex systems, at least not in a straightforward manner. The purpose of this article is to offer a careful reconstruction of the F-R argument, which allows us to show that: (i) the argument can be more clear…
In prior work, we have shown how the basic concepts and terms of quantum mechanics relate to factorizations and marginals of complex-valued quantum mass functions, which are generalizations of joint probability mass functions. In this paper, using quantum mass functions, we discuss the realization of measurements in terms of unitary interactions and marginalizations. It follows that classical measurement results strictly belong to local models, i.e., marginals of more detailed models. Classical variables that are created by marginalization do not exist in the unmarginalized model, and differen…
The Wigner's friend type of thought experiments manifest the conceptual challenge on how different observers can have consistent descriptions of a quantum measurement event. In this paper, we analyze the extended version of Wigner's friend thought experiment (Frauchiger and Renner, Nature Comm. 3711, 9 (2018)) in detail and show that the reasoning process from each agent that leads to the no-go theorem is inconsistent. The inconsistency is with respect to the requirement that an agent should make use of updated information instead of outdated information. We then apply the relational formulati…
This thesis reports progress in the analysis of causality and multi-agent logical paradoxes in quantum and post-quantum theories. These research areas are highly relevant for the foundations of physics as well as the development of quantum technologies. In the first part, focussing on causality, we develop techniques for using generalised entropies to analyse distinctions between classical and non-classical causal structures. We derive new properties of Tsallis entropies of systems that follow from the relevant causal structure, and apply these to obtain new necessary constraints for classical…
In his famous thought experiment, Wigner assigns an entangled state to the composite quantum system made up of Wigner's friend and her observed system. While the two of them have different accounts of the process, each Wigner and his friend can in principle verify his/her respective state assignments by performing an appropriate measurement. As manifested through a click in a detector or a specific position of the pointer, the outcomes of these measurements can be regarded as reflecting directly observable "facts". Reviewing arXiv:1507.05255, I will derive a no-go theorem for observer-independ…
According to QBism, quantum states, unitary evolutions, and measurement operators are all understood as personal judgments of the agent using the formalism. Meanwhile, quantum measurement outcomes are understood as the personal experiences of the same agent. Wigner's conundrum of the friend, in which two agents ostensibly have different accounts of whether or not there is a measurement outcome, thus poses no paradox for QBism. Indeed the resolution of Wigner's original thought experiment was central to the development of QBist thinking. The focus of this paper concerns two very instructive mod…
The decoherence interpretation of quantum measurements is applied to Wigner's friend experiments. A framework in which all the experimental outcomes arise from unitary evolutions is proposed. Within it, a measurement is not completed until an uncontrolled environment monitorizes the state composed by the system, the apparatus and the observer. The (apparent) wave-function collapse and the corresponding randomness result from tracing out this environment; it is thus the ultimate responsible for the emergence of definite outcomes. Two main effects arise from this fact. First, external interferen…
A general quantum circuit framework for Extended Wigner's Friend Scenarios: logically and causally consistent reasoning without absolute measurement events
ETH Zurich（苏黎世联邦理工学院）；Université Grenoble Alpes, Inria（格勒诺布尔阿尔卑斯大学，法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；ENS Lyon, Inria, LIP（里昂高等师范学校，法国国家信息与自动化研究所）
