政府科研计划支出及其差异
Government Expenditure on Research Plans and their Diversity
摘要：
在本研究中，我们考虑了政府的研究和开发投资。我们的研究是出于在预算分配的偏见，由于竞争性的资金制度。在我们的模型中，每个研究人员提出研究计划和费用，政府在两个时期选择一个研究计划--在政府知道它最喜欢的计划之前和之后--并在每个时期将资金用于所采用的计划。我们证明了，在一个子博弈精炼均衡中，政府会采取尽可能多的积极计划。在均衡中，所选择的计划按比例分配。因此，对研究项目的投资是对称和公正的。我们的研究结果意味着，在所有研究领域中同样广泛的支出比选择和集中在某些特定领域更好。
英文摘要：
In this study, we consider research and development investment by the government. Our study is motivated by the bias in the budget allocation owing to the competitive funding system. In our model, each researcher presents research plans and expenses, and the government selects a research plan in two periods---before and after the government knows its favorite plan---and spends funds on the adopted program in each period. We demonstrate that, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the government adopts equally as many active plans as possible. In an equilibrium, the selected plans are distributed proportionally. Thus, the investment in research projects is symmetric and unbiased. Our results imply that equally widespread expenditure across all research fields is better than the selection of and concentration in some specific fields.
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