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arXiv 1906.11372cs.GTcs.SYeess.SY
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防止非营利公用事业效率损失的激励机制

Incentive Mechanisms to Prevent Efficiency Loss of Non-Profit Utilities

Carlos Barreto, Eduardo Mojica-Nava, Nicanor Quijano

摘要:

电力系统的现代化采用了可通过提高用户能力来提高系统效率的技术。尽管这些技术具有潜在的好处,但也可能产生负面影响。这个问题已经被广泛分析,主要考虑营利性电力公司。然而,文献中有一个缺口,关于新技术对非营利公用事业的影响。在这项工作中,我们量化的无政府状态无政府代价的非营利公用事业,即用户缺乏协调所造成的成本。我们发现,在最坏的情况下,用户可以消费最多两倍的最优需求,获得最优盈余的一小部分。为此,我们利用机制设计的理论来设计一个激励方案,以减少系统的低效率,保护用户的隐私。我们用模拟说明了系统的效率损失,并给出了满足预算平衡和预算赤字的激励机制的两个例子。

英文摘要:

The modernization of the power system introduces technologies that may improve the system's efficiency by enhancing the capabilities of users. Despite their potential benefits, such technologies can have a negative impact. This subject has widely analyzed, mostly considering for-profit electric utilities. However, the literature has a gap regarding the impact of new technologies on non-profit utilities. In this work, we quantify the price of anarchy of non-profit utilities, that is, the cost caused by lack of coordination of users. We find that users, in the worst case, can consume up to twice the optimal demand, obtaining a small fraction of the optimal surplus. For this reason, we leverage the theory of mechanism design to design an incentive scheme that reduces the inefficiencies of the system, which preserves the privacy of users. We illustrate with simulations the efficiency loss of the system and show two instances of incentive mechanism that satisfy either budget balance and budget deficit.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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