互联网经济中的多元化：营利性中介的作用
Diversification in the Internet Economy:The Role of For-Profit Mediators
摘要：
我们调查的市场力量，将导致出现新的球员在赞助搜索市场。我们报告了3倍的多样化发起的赞助搜索市场的两个固有特征，即能力限制和当前机制的合谋脆弱性。在第一种情况下，我们提出了一个比较研究的两个模型的动机容量限制-一个额外的能力是由营利性代理商，谁竞争的插槽在原来的拍卖，吸引流量，并运行自己的子拍卖，和其他的，其中的额外容量是由拍卖人自己提供的，基本上作为一个调解人，并运行一个单一的组合拍卖。本研究是由我们在\cite{SRGR07}发起的，在那里研究了基于中介的模型。在目前的工作中，我们研究了基于拍卖的模型，并表明，这种模式似乎不如基于中介的模型在收入或效率保证方面，由于增加了容量。在第二种情况下，我们发起了一个博弈论的研究，目前赞助搜索拍卖，涉及激励驱动的调解人利用这些机制是不抗合谋的事实。特别是，我们表明，广告商可以提高他们的回报，通过使用的调解人的服务相比，直接参与拍卖，调解人也可以获得金钱上的好处，而不违反激励约束的广告商谁不使用其服务。我们还指出，拍卖人不能做很多通过机制设计，以避免这种营利性的调解，而不损失严重的收入，因此，调解人很可能会占上风。
英文摘要：
We investigate market forces that would lead to the emergence of new classes of players in the sponsored search market. We report a 3-fold diversification triggered by two inherent features of the sponsored search market, namely, capacity constraints and collusion-vulnerability of current mechanisms. In the first scenario, we present a comparative study of two models motivated by capacity constraints - one where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents, who compete for slots in the original auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions, and the other, where the additional capacity is provided by the auctioneer herself, by essentially acting as a mediator and running a single combined auction. This study was initiated by us in \cite{SRGR07}, where the mediator-based model was studied. In the present work, we study the auctioneer-based model and show that this model seems inferior to the mediator-based model in terms of revenue or efficiency guarantee due to added capacity. In the second scenario, we initiate a game theoretic study of current sponsored search auctions, involving incentive driven mediators who exploit the fact that these mechanisms are not collusion-resistant. In particular, we show that advertisers can improve their payoffs by using the services of the mediator compared to directly participating in the auction, and that the mediator can also obtain monetary benefit, without violating incentive constraints from the advertisers who do not use its services. We also point out that the auctioneer can not do very much via mechanism design to avoid such for-profit mediation without losing badly in terms of revenue, and therefore, the mediators are likely to prevail.
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