保护网络中的共享信息：一个带有战略攻击的网络安全游戏
Protecting shared information in networks: a network security game with strategic attacks
摘要：
泄露机密信息的数字安全漏洞不仅影响其系统被渗透的代理，而且对与渗透系统有社会联系的其他代理也是有害的。虽然有人认为，这些外部性造成了对安全投资不足的激励，但这一假设受到了战略对手攻击最不受保护的代理人的可能性的挑战。在本文中，我们研究了一个新的安全博弈模型，其中代理人共享令牌的敏感信息的接触网络。代理有机会投资于安全性，以防止可能是战略性或随机目标的攻击。我们发现，在随机攻击的存在下，投资不足总是占上风的纳什均衡相比，社会最优。相反，当攻击是战略性的时，投资不足或过度投资都是可能的，这取决于网络拓扑结构和信息传播过程的特征。实际上，当代理之间的依赖性较低时（这可能是因为信息网络连接稀疏，或者因为信息令牌共享的概率很小），代理在安全性上的投资比社会最优的要多。当信息共享更有可能时（因此，当攻击带来的风险更高时），这些过度投资就会转移到投资不足。
英文摘要：
A digital security breach, by which confidential information is leaked, does not only affect the agent whose system is infiltrated, but is also detrimental to other agents socially connected to the infiltrated system. Although it has been argued that these externalities create incentives to under-invest in security, this presumption is challenged by the possibility of strategic adversaries that attack the least protected agents. In this paper we study a new model of security games in which agents share tokens of sensitive information in a network of contacts. The agents have the opportunity to invest in security to protect against an attack that can be either strategically or randomly targeted. We show that, in the presence of random attack, under-investments always prevail at the Nash equilibrium in comparison with the social optimum. Instead, when the attack is strategic, either under-investments or over-investments are possible, depending on the network topology and on the characteristics of the process of the spreading of information. Actually, agents invest more in security than socially optimal when dependencies among agents are low (which can happen because the information network is sparsely connected or because the probability that information tokens are shared is small). These over-investments pass on to under-investments when information sharing is more likely (and therefore, when the risk brought by the attack is higher).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
