具有策略代理和感染级联的相互依赖安全性
Interdependent Security with Strategic Agents and Cascades of Infection
摘要：
我们调查级联的网络组成的战略代理相互依赖的安全。我们假设战略代理人可以在以下三种选择中做出选择：i）投资于保护自己，ii）购买保险以转移（一些）风险，iii）不采取任何行动。使用人口博弈模型，我们研究了各种系统参数，如节点度，感染传播速度，感染的节点传播感染到邻居的概率，影响节点的选择在纳什均衡和由此产生的无政府代价/稳定。此外，我们研究了一个单一的感染节点可以传播感染到整个网络的一个重要部分，称为级联概率的概率，行为相对于系统参数。特别是，我们证明，至少对于某些参数制度，级联概率增加的平均度的节点。
英文摘要：
We investigate cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between i) investing in protecting themselves, ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some) risks, and iii) taking no actions. Using a population game model, we study how various system parameters, such as node degrees, infection propagation rate, and the probability with which infected nodes transmit infection to neighbors, affect nodes' choices at Nash equilibria and the resultant price of anarchy/stability. In addition, we examine how the probability that a single infected node can spread the infection to a significant portion of the entire network, called cascade probability, behaves with respect to system parameters. In particular, we demonstrate that, at least for some parameter regimes, the cascade probability increases with the average degree of nodes.
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