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arXiv 1504.04796cs.SI
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传染扩散与源头识别:一场捉迷藏游戏

Infection Spreading and Source Identification: A Hide and Seek Game

Wuqiong Luo, Wee Peng Tay, Mei Leng

摘要:

感染源节点的目标(例如,谣言或计算机病毒源)传播其感染到尽可能多的节点,同时对网络管理员保持隐藏。另一方面,网络管理员旨在基于哪些节点已被感染的知识来识别源节点。我们将感染传播和源识别问题建模为一个策略博弈,其中感染源和网络管理员是两个参与者。由于乔丹中心估计是一个极大极小源估计,已被证明是强大的,在最近的作品,我们假设,网络管理员利用源估计策略,可以探测任何节点在给定的半径内的乔丹中心。给定任何估计策略,我们为源设计最佳响应感染策略。给定任何感染策略,我们为网络管理员设计了一个最佳响应估计策略。我们推导出策略博弈的纳什均衡存在的条件。在合成网络和真实网络中的仿真表明,我们提出的感染策略感染更多的节点,同时保持相同的安全裕度之间的真实源节点和约旦中心源估计。

英文摘要:

The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source) in a network is to spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge of which nodes have been infected. We model the infection spreading and source identification problem as a strategic game, where the infection source and the network administrator are the two players. As the Jordan center estimator is a minimax source estimator that has been shown to be robust in recent works, we assume that the network administrator utilizes a source estimation strategy that can probe any nodes within a given radius of the Jordan center. Given any estimation strategy, we design a best-response infection strategy for the source. Given any infection strategy, we design a best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator. We derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game exists. Simulations in both synthetic and real-world networks demonstrate that our proposed infection strategy infects more nodes while maintaining the same safety margin between the true source node and the Jordan center source estimator.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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