网络市场平台的透明度和控制
Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets
摘要：
在本文中，我们分析了网络古诺竞争模型下的在线平台设计的最坏情况下的效率损失。受当今运营的一些最大平台的启发，我们考虑的平台设计研究了透明度和控制之间的权衡。我们的研究结果表明，开放获取设计激励生产增加到完全竞争的水平，并限制效率损失，而控制分配设计导致生产者平台激励错位，导致低参与和无限的效率损失。我们还表明，歧视性的准入设计平衡透明度和控制，实现最好的两个世界保持高参与率，同时限制效率损失。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we analyze the worst case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Cournot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms in operation today, the platform designs that we consider examine the trade-off between transparency and control. Our results show that open access designs incentivize increased production towards perfectly competitive levels and limit efficiency loss, while controlled allocation designs lead to producer-platform incentive misalignment, resulting in low participation and unbounded efficiency loss. We also show that discriminatory access designs balance transparency and control, achieving the best of both worlds by maintaining high participation rates while limiting efficiency loss.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
