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arXiv 1903.02018math.OC
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支付动力学模型与演化动力学模型:反馈与均衡收敛

Payoff Dynamics Model and Evolutionary Dynamics Model: Feedback and Convergence to Equilibria

Shinkyu Park, Nuno C. Martins, Jeff S. Shamma

摘要:

这篇教程文章提出了一个框架来分析大量有限理性主体成员之间的非合作策略交互。我们的方法取决于,统一和推广现有的方法和模型预测的进化和人口游戏。它通过采用系统理论的形式主义,是非常适合于广泛的工程观众熟悉的基本原则的非线性动力系统,李雅普诺夫稳定性,存储功能,和无源性。该框架是相关的工程应用程序中,大量的代理人有权选择和反复修改他们的策略。一个机制,是固有的问题在手,或设计和实施的协调员赋予每一个可能的战略回报。通常情况下,代理人将优先切换到策略,其回报要么高于当前的回报,要么超过人口平均水平。本文提出了一个系统的方法来表征的稳定性的动力系统,结果之间的反馈相互作用的回报机制和修订过程。这一点很重要,因为稳定均衡集是种群长期行为的准确预测器。文章包括严格的证明和应用的稳定性结果的例子,这也扩展了最先进的,因为,不像以前发表的工作,他们允许一个相当一般的类的动态回报机制。这里提出的新的结果和概念进行了彻底的比较,以前的工作,方法和应用的进化和人口游戏。

英文摘要:

This tutorial article puts forth a framework to analyze the noncooperative strategic interactions among the members of a large population of bounded rationality agents. Our approach hinges on, unifies and generalizes existing methods and models predicated in evolutionary and population games. It does so by adopting a system-theoretic formalism that is well-suited for a broad engineering audience familiar with the basic tenets of nonlinear dynamical systems, Lyapunov stability, storage functions, and passivity. The framework is pertinent for engineering applications in which a large number of agents have the authority to select and repeatedly revise their strategies. A mechanism that is inherent to the problem at hand or is designed and implemented by a coordinator ascribes a payoff to each possible strategy. Typically, the agents will prioritize switching to strategies whose payoff is either higher than the current one or exceeds the population average. The article puts forth a systematic methodology to characterize the stability of the dynamical system that results from the feedback interaction between the payoff mechanism and the revision process. This is important because the set of stable equilibria is an accurate predictor of the population's long-term behavior. The article includes rigorous proofs and examples of application of the stability results, which also extend the state of the art because, unlike previously published work, they allow for a rather general class of dynamical payoff mechanisms. The new results and concepts proposed here are thoroughly compared to previous work, methods and applications of evolutionary and population games.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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