Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws of quantum physics allows the secure distribution of secret keys over an insecure channel. Unfortunately, imperfect implementations of QKD compromise its information-theoretical security. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement unit, which is regarded as the "Achilles' heel" of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI-QKD is however that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show theoretically for the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols. Our theoretical security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of the emitted pulses. Moreover, a laser seeding attack might be launched as well against decoy-state based quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.
When atoms scatter photons from a transverse laser into a high-finesse optical cavity, they form crystalline structures which maximize the intracavity light field and trap the atoms in the ordered array. Stable organization occurs when the laser field amplitude exceeds a certain threshold. For planar single-mode cavities there exist two equivalent possible atomic patterns, which determine the phase of the intracavity light field. Under these premises, we show that the effect of an additional laser pumping the cavity makes one pattern more favorable than the other and that it can dynamically fo…
A study of the evolution of two-mode squeezing, entanglement and intensity of the cavity radiation of a two-photon correlated emission laser initially seeded with a thermal light is presented. The dependence of the degree of two-mode squeezing and entanglement on the intensity of the thermal light and time is found to have more or less a similar nature, although the actual values differ specially in the early stages of the process and when the atoms are initially prepared in nearly 50:50 probability to be in the upper and lower energy levels. Particularly, seeding the cavity turns out to spoil…
Here, we investigate the security of the practical one-way CVQKD and CV-MDI-QKD systems under laser seeding attack. In particular, Eve can inject a suitable light into the laser diodes of the light source modules in the two kinds of practical CVQKD systems, which results in the increased intensity of the generated optical signal. The parameter estimation under the attack shows that the secret key rates of these two schemes may be overestimated, which opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack on these systems. To close this loophole, we propose a real-…
Injection locking is a well known and commonly used method for coherent light amplification. Usually injection locking is done with a single-frequency seeding beam. In this work we show that injection locking may also be achieved in the case of multi-frequency seeding beam when slave laser provides sufficient frequency filtering. One relevant parameter turns out to be the frequency detuning between the free running slave laser and each injected frequency component. Stable selective locking to a set of three components separated of $1.2\,$GHz is obtained for (positive) detuning values between z…
We introduce a new class of quantum quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the BB84 only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.
Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution
Russian Quantum Center（俄罗斯量子中心）；NTI Center for Quantum Communications, National University of Science and Technology MISiS（NTI量子通信中心，国立科技大学MISiS）；Prokhorov General Physics Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences（俄罗斯科学院普洛霍罗夫普通物理研究所）；Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo（维戈大学维戈量子通信中心）；School of Telecommunication Engineering, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo（维戈大学电信工程学院信号理论与通信系）；atlanTTic Research Center, University of Vigo（维戈大学atlanTTic研究中心）；National Research University Higher School of Economics（国立高等经济大学）；College of Computer Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology（国防科技大学计算机科学与技术学院）；Institute of Automation and Electrometry of Siberian Branch of RAS（俄罗斯科学院西伯利亚分院自动化与电磁学研究所）
This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letter's conclusions.
Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be pre-calibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We have tested four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and found that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropp…
A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an addition…
Modern cryptographic protocols rely on sophisticated hash functions to generate quasi-unique numbers that serve as signatures for user authentication and other security verifications. The security could be compromised by finding texts hash-mappable to identical numbers, forming so-called collision attack. Seeding a disturbance vector in the hash mapping to obtain a successful collision is that a major focus of cryptography study in the past two decades to improve hash protocols. We propose an algorithm that takes advantage of entangled quantum states for concurrent seeding of candidate disturb…
Security in quantum cryptography is continuously challenged by inventive attacks targeting the real components of a cryptographic setup, and duly restored by new counter-measures to foil them. Due to their high sensitivity and complex design, detectors are the most frequently attacked components. Recently it was shown that two-photon interference from independent light sources can be exploited to avoid the use of detectors at the two ends of the communication channel. This new form of detection-safe quantum cryptography, called Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD),…
Robustness of fiber-optic attenuators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed laser radiation in quantum key distribution systems
Russian Quantum Center（俄罗斯量子中心）；NTI Center for Quantum Communications, National University of Science and Technology MISiS（国家科学技术大学MISiS NTI量子通信中心）；Prokhorov General Physics Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences（俄罗斯科学院普尔科沃普通物理研究所）；National Research Nuclear University MEPhI（国立核研究大学莫斯科工程物理学院）；Ulyanovsk State University（乌里扬诺夫斯克国立大学）；College of Computer Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology（国防科技大学计算机科学与技术学院）；Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo（维戈大学维戈量子通信中心）；School of Telecommunication Engineering（电信工程学院）
In ultralong fiber laser key distribution, two sides use standard optical equipment to create kilometer long fiber lasers in a communication link to establish a secret key. Its security rests on the assumption that any attacker would need much more sophisticated equipment and techniques than those of the legitimate user in order to discover the generated key. We present a challenge to that assumption with a hidden probe attack in which the eavesdropper hides a weak signal in the unavoidable noise floor that appears in the laser during amplification and probes with it the configuration of one o…
Practical implementations of quantum cryptography use attenuated laser pulses as the signal source rather than single photons. The channels used to transmit are also lossy. Here we give a simple derivation of two beam-splitting attacks on quantum cryptographic systems using laser pulses, either coherent or mixed states with any mean photon number. We also give a simple derivation of a photon-number splitting attack, the most advanced, both in terms of performance and technology required. We find bounds on the maximum disturbance for a given mean photon number and observed channel transmission …
Spectral side channels of wavelength-division multiplexer in quantum key distribution under laser damage
College of Computer Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology（国防科技大学计算机学院）；Russian Quantum Center（俄罗斯量子中心）；NTI Center for Quantum Communications, National University of Science and Technology MISiS（国立科技大学MISiS NTI量子通信中心）；China Telecom Quantum Information Technology Group Co., Ltd.（中国电信量子信息技术集团有限公司）；College of Electronic Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology（国防科技大学电子科学学院）
We propose a new class of quantum key distribution protocol, that ended up to be robust against photon number splitting attacks in the weak laser pulse implementations. This protocol comprises of BB84 protocol and SARG protocol, especially in aspects of controlling classical sifting procedures of two protocols. The protocol is more secure than both of BB84 protocol and SARG protocol, and the ultimate limit of robustness in the proposed protocol expands as well than both of them.
The eavesdropper technique nowadays is already improved from the theoretical perspective to the experimental perspective. The technique now more focusing on the loopholes of the components used such as modulator, laser, and detector. These all components actually are the classical component which normally being used in the communication system. The technique called "blinding detector" introduce by Vadim Makarov et. al. exploit the unavailability of a true single-photon detector. The detector behavior which is avalanche photodiode (APD) is being used in almost all quantum system and exploiting …
Inspired by the methodology used for classical cryptographic hardware, we consider the use of attack ratings in the context of QKD security evaluation. To illustrate the relevance of this approach, we conduct an experimental vulnerability assessment of CV-QKD against saturation attacks, for two different attack strategies. The first strategy relies on inducing detector saturation by performing a large coherent displacement. This strategy is experimentally challenging and therefore translates into a high attack rating. We also propose and experimentally demonstrate a second attack strategy that…
Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.
The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modula…
A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against the most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The eavesdropper (Eve) is supposed to have unlimited technological power while the honest parties (Alice and Bob) use present day technology, in particular an attenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. They exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states for decreasing the information…
Recently, Tsai et al. (Laser Phys. Lett. 17, 075202, 2020) proposed a lightweight authenticated semi-quantum key distribution protocol for a quantum participant to share a secret key with a classical participant. However, this study points out that an attacker can use a modification attack to make both participants share a wrong key without being detected. To avoid this problem, an improvement is proposed here.
Since the introduction of the decoy-state technique, phase-randomised weak coherent light pulses have been the key to increase the practicality of quantum-based communications. Their ultra-fast generation was accomplished via compact gain-switched (GS) lasers, leading to high key rates in quantum key distribution (QKD). Recently, the question arose of whether the same laser could be employed to achieve high-speed measurement-device-independent-QKD, a scheme that promises long-haul quantum communications immune to all detector attacks. For that, a challenging highvisibility interference between…
The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultra-low-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.
Source-independent quantum key distribution without pre-sending entanglement
School of Physics and Key Laboratory of Quantum State Construction and Manipulation (Ministry of Education), Renmin University of China（中国人民大学物理学院、量子态构建与操控教育部重点实验室）
We develop an improvement to the weak laser pulse BB84 scheme for quantum key distribution, which utilizes entanglement to improve the security of the scheme and enhance its resilience to the photon-number-splitting attack. This protocol relies on the non-commutation of photon phase and number to detect an eavesdropper performing quantum non-demolition measurement on number. The potential advantages and disadvantages of this scheme are compared to the coherent decoy state protocol.
We propose an efficient strategy to attack a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) system, that we call homodyne detector blinding. This attack strategy takes advantage of a generic vulnerability of homodyne receivers: a bright light pulse sent on the signal port can lead to a saturation of the detector electronics. While detector saturation has already been proposed to attack CV-QKD, the attack we study in this paper has the additional advantage of not requiring an eavesdropper to be phase locked with the homodyne receiver. We show that under certain conditions, an attacker ca…
We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely insecure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After about 1 W illumination, the detectors' dark count rate reduces 2 to 5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance. After about 1.5 W, the detect…
The temperature of the semiconductor diode increases under strong light illumination whether thermoelectric cooler is installed or not, which changes the output wavelength of the laser (Lee M. S. et al., 2017). However, other characteristics also vary as temperature increases. These variations may help the eavesdropper in practical quantum key distribution systems. We study the effects of temperature increase on gain-switched semiconductor lasers by simulating temperature dependent rate equations. The results show that temperature increase may cause large intensity fluctuation, decrease the ou…
A typical implementation of BB84 protocol for quantum communication uses four laser diodes for transmitting weak coherent pulses, which may not have the same characteristics. We have characterized these lasers for mismatch in various parameters such as spectral width, pulse width, spatial mode, peak wavelength, polarization and their arrival times at the receiver. This information is utilized to calculate possible information leakage through side channel attacks by evaluating mutual information between source and eavesdropper. Based on our experimental observations of cross correlation between…
By harnessing quantum effects, we nowadays can use encryption that is in principle proven to withstand any conceivable attack. These fascinating quantum features have been implemented in metropolitan quantum networks around the world. In order to interconnect such networks over long distances, optical satellite communication is the method of choice. Standard telecommunication components allow one to efficiently implement quantum communication by measuring field quadratures (continuous variables). This opens the possibility to adapt our Laser Communication Terminals (LCTs) to quantum key distri…
