大气层中Escherichdropper攻击自由空间量子密钥分发接收机的能力turbulence
Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence
摘要：
窃听者（Eve）通过精确控制攻击激光的入射角来对自由空间量子密钥分发（QKD）接收器执行拦截-重发攻击的能力先前已经被证明。然而，这种攻击可能是无效的，在大气湍流的存在下，由于光束漂移和空间模式畸变引起的空气的折射率变化。我们通过空间光调制器模拟大气湍流，实验研究了湍流对Eve攻击自由空间偏振编码QKD接收机的影响。我们的研究结果确定如何以及夏娃将需要补偿湍流进行成功的攻击，通过减少她的距离接收器，或使用光束波前校正通过自适应光学。此外，我们使用一个纠缠打破计划，找到一个理论限制的湍流强度，阻碍夏娃的攻击。
英文摘要：
The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver, or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve's attack.
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