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arXiv quant-ph/0607186quant-ph
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optical fiber中的长距离诱骗态量子密钥分发

Long distance decoy state quantum key distribution in optical fiber

Danna Rosenberg, Jim W. Harrington, Patrick R. Rice, Philip A. Hiskett, Charles G. Peterson, Richard J. Hughes, Adriana E. Lita, Sae Woo Nam, Jane E. Nordholt

摘要:

光子数分裂攻击的理论存在为大多数使用高度衰减的激光源的量子密钥分发(QKD)演示创建了安全漏洞。使用超低噪声,高效率的过渡边缘传感器光电探测器,我们已经实现了第一个版本的诱饵状态协议,该协议在单向QKD系统中不使用高斯近似的情况下结合了有限的统计数据,从而能够创建对光子数分裂攻击免疫的安全密钥,并在107公里的光纤上高度抵抗特洛伊木马攻击。

英文摘要:

The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultra-low-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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