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arXiv 1902.06908cs.GT
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拍卖价格的推断

Inference from Auction Prices

Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Zihe Wang

摘要:

计量经济学推理允许分析者从机制的规则和代理人的出价中收回机制中代理人的价值。本文给出了一个算法来解决在支配策略机制中,从该机制实现的社会选择函数和代理支付的单位价格(代理出价不被观察)来推断代理的价值的问题。对于单维代理,这个推理问题是支付身份的多维反演,并且只有当支付身份是唯一可逆的时才是可行的。对于单一单位比例权重的社会选择函数(例如,在带宽分配中常见),逆是唯一的;并且可以有效地找到它的逆。这种反转并不是唯一的社会选择功能,表现出互补性。独立的兴趣,我们扩展了罗森(1965)的一个结果,即纳什均衡的“凹游戏”是唯一的和纯粹的,一个替代的概念,基于盖尔和Nikaido(1965年)。

英文摘要:

Econometric inference allows an analyst to back out the values of agents in a mechanism from the rules of the mechanism and bids of the agents. This paper gives an algorithm to solve the problem of inferring the values of agents in a dominant-strategy mechanism from the social choice function implemented by the mechanism and the per-unit prices paid by the agents (the agent bids are not observed). For single-dimensional agents, this inference problem is a multi-dimensional inversion of the payment identity and is feasible only if the payment identity is uniquely invertible. The inversion is unique for single-unit proportional weights social choice functions (common, for example, in bandwidth allocation); and its inverse can be found efficiently. This inversion is not unique for social choice functions that exhibit complementarities. Of independent interest, we extend a result of Rosen (1965), that the Nash equilbria of "concave games" are unique and pure, to an alternative notion of concavity based on Gale and Nikaido (1965).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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