arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1902.03779cs.GT
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社交网络上多候选人消息的选举操纵

Election Manipulation on Social Networks with Messages on Multiple Candidates

Matteo Castiglioni, Diodato Ferraioli, Giulia Landriani, Nicola Gatti

摘要:

我们研究的问题,通过社会影响力的选举控制时,操纵者被允许使用的位置,她在网络上获得的发送\emph{both}积极和消极的消息对\emph{multiple}候选人,广泛扩展了以前的研究结果,在文献中,一个单一的消息对一个单一的候选人的影响。特别是,我们提供了一个严格的设置,其中的最大增加幅度的胜利可以有效地近似和那些在任何近似原来是不可能的表征。我们还表明,在简单的网络中,一个大类的算法,主要包括最近采用的社会影响问题的所有方法,未能计算一个有界的近似,即使在非常简单的网络,无向图与每个节点有一个度最多两个或有向树。最后,我们研究了模型的各种扩展和推广。

英文摘要:

We study the problem of election control through social influence when the manipulator is allowed to use the locations that she acquired on the network for sending \emph{both} positive and negative messages on \emph{multiple} candidates, widely extending the previous results available in the literature that study the influence of a single message on a single candidate. In particular, we provide a tight characterization of the settings in which the maximum increase in the margin of victory can be efficiently approximated and of those in which any approximation turns out to be impossible. We also show that, in simple networks, a large class of algorithms, mainly including all approaches recently adopted for social-influence problems, fail to compute a bounded approximation even on very simple networks, as undirected graphs with every node having a degree at most two or directed trees. Finally, we investigate various extensions and generalizations of the model.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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